Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2016

Private Market Alternatives for Maintaining Wetland Viability in
Coastal Louisiana: A Double-Hurdle Approach
Hua Wang
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Wang, Hua, "Private Market Alternatives for Maintaining Wetland Viability in Coastal Louisiana: A DoubleHurdle Approach" (2016). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 4258.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4258

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.

PRIVATE MARKET ALTERNATIVES FOR MAINTAINING WETLAND
VIABILITY IN COASTAL LOUISIANA: A DOUBLE-HURDLE APPROACH

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness

by
Hua Wang
B.S., Xiangtan University, 2002
M.S., Louisiana State University, 2012
December 2016

DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Wanying and Defu, my wife, Miao, and my
sons, Gavin and Gabriel.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to my major professor, Dr. Water R. Keithly, for his guidance, patience,
everlasting support, positive attitude when things did not go as expected, and allowing me to be
independent with my research. Without his constant encouragement and help, this dissertation
would not have been possible.
I would like to thank my committee members: Dr. John V. Westra, Dr. Krishna P.
Paudel, Dr. Rex H. Caffey, and Dr. Gregg Henderson for their valuable advice and feedback on
all aspects of my research. Special thanks to Ms. Huizhen Niu for GIS technical support. Thanks
to Dr. Gail Cramer for his encouragement throughout my graduate studies. I would like to thank
Dr. Berdikul Qushim, Ms. Marla W. Jones, and Ms. Jody K. Bissett for their support and help.
Many thanks to Louisiana Sea Grant for the financial support (R/RRE-12). I would also like to
thank the Tax Assessors in Cameron, Vermilion, Terrebonne, Lafourche, and Plaquemines
Parishes for providing data needed to conduct this research and special thanks to all the
landowners who participated in the study.
I give my deepest expression of love and appreciation to my family members for their
unconditional support and care.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
1.1 General Background ............................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Problem Statement ................................................................................................................ 2
1.3 Research Justification ........................................................................................................... 3
1.4 Study Objectives ................................................................................................................... 5
1.5 Dissertation Structure............................................................................................................ 6
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 8
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Policies and Programs Related to Wetland ........................................................................... 8
2.3 Wetland Restoration Status in Louisiana ............................................................................ 14
2.3.1 Current Wetland Restoration Efforts in Louisiana ...................................................... 14
2.3.2 Potential Policy Instruments in Louisiana ................................................................... 14
2.4 General Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation ....................................................... 16
2.4.1 Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation in Wetland Restoration Programs ....... 16
2.4.2 Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation in Different Conservation Programs ... 24
2.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 30
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE .......................................................................... 32
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 32
3.2 The Utility Theory .............................................................................................................. 32
3.3 The Expected Utility ........................................................................................................... 35
3.4 The Net Present Value Rule ................................................................................................ 40
3.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 44

iv

CHAPTER 4 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION ..................................................................... 45
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 45
4.2 The Standard Tobit Model .................................................................................................. 48
4.3 The Generalized Tobit Model (Heckit Model) ................................................................... 49
4.4 The Double-Hurdle Model .................................................................................................. 52
4.5 Specification Issues ............................................................................................................. 59
4.5.1 Heteroskedasticity ........................................................................................................ 59
4.5.2 Non-Normal Error Structure ........................................................................................ 60
4.6 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 61
CHAPTER 5 SURVEY AND DESCRIPTION STATISTICS .................................................... 63
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 63
5.2 Survey Design and Response .............................................................................................. 64
5.2.1 Survey Design and Implementation ............................................................................. 64
5.2.2 Survey Responses ........................................................................................................ 71
5.3 Descriptive Analysis ........................................................................................................... 72
5.3.1 Characteristics of the Landowner ................................................................................ 72
5.3.2 Characteristics of the Property ..................................................................................... 74
5.3.3 Landowner’s Attitude toward Wetland Restoration Program and Policy Instruments 79
5.4 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 82
CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................................................................................ 84
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 84
6.2 Potential Variables .............................................................................................................. 85
6.2.1 Response Variables ...................................................................................................... 85
6.2.2 Explanatory Variables .................................................................................................. 87
6.3 Model Specification ............................................................................................................ 95
6.3.1 Econometric Specification ........................................................................................... 95
6.3.2 Model Selection ........................................................................................................... 97
6.4 Results of the Double-Hurdle Model .................................................................................. 99
6.4.1 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimates ...................................................................... 100
6.4.2 Marginal Effects (ME) Estimates .............................................................................. 104
6.5 Empirical Simulation ........................................................................................................ 113
6.6 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 116

v

CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 120
7.1 Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................................. 120
7.2 Limitations and Further Research ..................................................................................... 123
7.3 Policy Recommendations.................................................................................................. 125
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 128
APPENDIX A. COPY OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL ..................... 138
APPENDIX B. WETLAND ECONOMIC SURVEY ................................................................ 139
APPENDIX C. LEVEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION .......................................................... 144
APPENDIX D. RESULTS OF THE STANDARD TOBIT MODEL ........................................ 145
APPENDIX E. RESULTS OF THE GENERALIZED TOBIT MODEL .................................. 146
APPENDIX F. RESULTS OF THE EXPONENTIAL DOUBLE-HURDLE MODEL ............ 148
APPENDIX G. EMPIRICAL SIMULATION ........................................................................... 150
VITA ........................................................................................................................................... 153

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.1 Survey Responses ......................................................................................................... 71
Table 5.2 General Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Landowner .................. 73
Table 5.3 Statistical Descriptive of Land Characteristics and Ownership Structure .................... 75
Table 5.4 Reported Income Derived from Commercial-Based Activities .................................... 78
Table 5.5 Landowner Participated in State or Federal Wetland Restoration Program ................. 79
Table 6.1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics ............................................................ 86
Table 6.2 Model Specification Statistical Tests ............................................................................ 98
Table 6.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Double-Hurdle Model ................................ 101
Table 6.4 Marginal Effects with Respect to Continuous and Discrete Variables ....................... 106

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 5.1 Coastal Parishes in Louisiana ...................................................................................... 66
Figure 5.2 Study Area Included Landowners in Five Parishes along Coastal Louisiana ............. 66
Figure 5.3 Number of Participants Surveyed across Five Coastal Parishes in Louisiana ............ 68
Figure 5.4 An Example of GIS Map of Wetland Parcel in Coastal Louisiana ............................. 69
Figure 5.5 An Example of Assessment Listing of Wetland Parcel in Coastal Louisiana ............. 70
Figure 5.6 Number of Responses from Each Study Parish ........................................................... 72
Figure 5.7 Wetland Composition by Coastal Landowners ........................................................... 75
Figure 5.8 Landowner’s Responses to Participate in Commercial-Based Activities ................... 76
Figure 5.9 Landowner’s Responses about Different Type of Commercial-Based Activities....... 77
Figure 5.10 Landowner’s Responses to Active Management the Wetland Parcel for Waterfowl
Habitat and Presence or Absence of a Hunting Lodge/Camp on the Wetland Parcel .................. 78
Figure 5.11 Landowner’s Response to Receive Sub-Surface (Oil & Gas) Revenue .................... 79
Figure 5.12 Landowner’s Attitudes Concerning Various Reasons that Influence Their Decisions
to Participate in Wetland Restoration Programs ........................................................................... 80
Figure 5.13 Landowner’s Preference for Various Policy Instruments in Regards to Wetland
Restoration in Coastal Louisiana .................................................................................................. 81

viii

ABSTRACT
The coastal zone of Louisiana contains more than three million wetland acres, or about
40 percent of the nation’s total. Since 1930, Louisiana has experienced a net loss of over 1,900
square miles of coastal wetlands. Currently at risk are the remaining coastal wetlands, 80 percent
of which are under private ownership. The acceptance of private wetland owners to restoration
programs and their participation in these programs are critical if future coastal restoration efforts
are to be successful. Gaining the cooperation by the coastal landowners, however, is complicated
by the fact that while the public benefits accruing from wetland protection and restoration
projects are likely to be large, private benefits are likely to be small and, potentially, negative.
The primary goal of this research is to examine the factors that motivate private coastal
landowners to participate in income-generating activities and the level of income derived from
their coastal wetland parcels and with this understanding to assess current and potential policy
instruments that might provide incentives for private coastal wetlands stewardship.
Using data collected from a sample of coastal wetland owners, a double-hurdle model
was used to econometrically identify the determinants on the participation and level of
participation in income-generating activities. The results based on the estimated parameters and
marginal effects confirmed that decisions to participate in income-generating activities and the
level of participation are related to physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic
characteristics of the landowner.

ix

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Background
Louisiana’s coastal wetlands provide a variety of economic, ecological, cultural and
recreational values to residents of the state and the coastal wetlands of south Louisiana are one of
the most important, productive ecosystems in the United States. Benefits of coastal wetlands
include flood control, shoreline protection, carbon storage, the provision of biological diversity,
and supporting fishery and ecotourism industries (Costanza et al. 1997; Odum 1988; Pennings
and Bertness 2001). The coastal zone of Louisiana includes more than three million wetland
acres, or about 40% of the nation’s total. (Lipton et al. 1995; LOSCO, 2005).
While Louisiana’s wetland acreage is vast, the state has experienced a net loss of over
1,900 square miles (1,216,000 acres) of coastal wetlands since the 1930’s, representing an
acceleration of 10 times the natural land loss rate (LCWCRTF and WCRA 1998; CPRA 2000;
Britsch and Dunbar 1993). The estimated land loss rate has been in excess of 40 square miles per
year during the past half century and between 25 and 35 square miles per year during the
1990’s.1 This loss implies that wetlands revert to open water, thus causing shifts in land uses and
ecological functions. There are a number of factors contributing to this loss. In part, natural
evolutionary processes, including sea-level rise, land subsidence, erosion, saltwater intrusion,
tropical storm, and hurricane impacts contribute to coastal wetland losses. Human disturbances
also share a large part of the responsibility for the balance of wetland growth and decline.
Historic decisions to levee the Mississippi and Atchafalaya rivers and to construct the Gulf

1

Barras et al. (2003) pointed out that the current land loss rate at an average of 24 square miles (15,360 acres) per
year. The rate of coastal land loss in Louisiana represents 80% of the coastal wetland loss in the entire continental
United States (LCWCRTF 1998)
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Intracoastal Waterway, ship channels, and access canals for hydrocarbon resource exploitation
are primary reasons for the land loss. Channelization led to the redirection of alluvial sediments
away from the coast, exacerbated erosion, and accelerated saltwater intrusion (Barras et al. 2003;
Dunbar et al. 1992; LaCPRA 2007). These human-based forces have led to a situation where 160
-200 million metric tons per year of sediments, once enriching the coastal wetlands, are now
delivered directly onto the outer continental shelf (Caffey and Shexnayder 2003). Other factors,
including upstream dams and soil conservation practices, have modified the movement of
freshwater, suspended sediment, and made the coastal ecosystem more susceptible to saltwater
intrusion have also contributed to the loss of these wetlands (Caffey et al. 2003).
1.2 Problem Statement
Without significant action, and based on the current loss rate, Louisiana will lose an
estimated additional 800 thousand wetland acres by the year 2040 (Desmond, 2005). Wicker
(1980, 1981) suggested that up to 60% of the Louisiana wetlands currently at risk can be
managed to minimize further losses, mainly through the control of water flows and the
restoration of coastal vegetation. More recently, Turner (1999) has suggested that small-scale
projects, such as the construction of ‘artificial’ crevasses, spoil bank management, and terracing
appear to be particularly cost effective in wetland restoration and creation efforts. While the
technology necessary for management varies in complexity and cost (Spicer et al. 1986; Turner
1999), in most cases solutions will either impact or be implemented on private lands.
In 2006, over 2 million residents -more than 47% of the state’s population according to
U.S. Census estimates- lived in Louisiana’s coastal parishes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).
Currently at risk are the remaining coastal wetlands, 80% of which are under private ownership.
2

The acceptance of private wetland owners to restoration programs and their participation in these
programs are critical if future coastal restoration efforts are to be successful. Gaining the
cooperation by the coastal landowners, however, is complicated by the fact that while the public
benefits accruing from wetland protection and restoration projects are likely to be large, private
benefits (measured by changes in net income to the landowner) are likely to be small and,
potentially, negative.2 The risk averse nature of the majority of coastal landowners (Dedah,
2010) in conjunction with the relatively low income derived from surface-use activities suggest
that, unless well-crafted to protect or enhance their private benefits, opposition by the
landowners to publically funded restoration projects is likely to be high even if the expected
public benefits associated with the project are large.3, 4
1.3 Research Justification
Roberts et al. (1999) report that across all wetland types (freshwater, brackish, and salt),
two types of enterprises - alligator (including egg collection) and hunting (primarily the leasing
of property for waterfowl hunting) - comprise the vast majority of surface-based revenues.5 In
light of this situation, this dissertation proposes to develop a comprehensive framework for
understanding the motivation among coastal landowners to participate in either or both of these
enterprises and the physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic characteristics of

2

Small private benefits from a publically-funded restoration project are the outcome when property changes
associated with that project yield only marginal positive income changes to the landowner. Negative private benefits
accrue when the landowner’s post-project income as a result of project implementation is reduced.
3
Dedah (2010) found that almost three-quarters of coastal wetland owners exhibited risk-averse behavior.
4
Based on a 1998 study by Roberts et al. (1999), net income derived from surface-use activities of the coastal
wetlands ranged from a high of $2.25 for freshwater marsh to a low of $0.37 for saltwater marsh. Furthermore, 40%
of the owners of freshwater marsh and 67% of the owners of saltwater marsh reported losses.
5
Many of the coastal properties also yield considerable sub-surface revenues associated with the extraction of oil
and gas. Only the surface revenues are considered in this study with the exception that, as discussed later, subsurface revenues may influence owner participation in the generation of surface revenues as well as the intensity of
participation.
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the landowner that determine the intensity of participation (and, as such, the expected returns
from participation). Beginning with a theoretical model of private decision making with spatial
heterogeneity, landowners are surveyed as a part of this dissertation to obtain information about
their socioeconomic characteristics, including attitudes toward the use of their properties for
income-based activities, attributes of their properties, revenues derived from their properties
(associated with the two enterprises), and attitudes towards coastal restoration projects. Next, this
research proposes to analyze the participation rate and the intensity of participation (i.e.,
revenues generated from the two enterprises) with respect to the combination of physical
characteristics associated with the individual parcels and the socioeconomic characteristics of the
wetland owner. As discussed in the Approach section, this will be accomplished using a doublehurdle decision model where the first ‘hurdle’ considers the participation decision (yes, no) and
the second hurdle provides an estimate of revenues conditioned on the outcome of the first
hurdle. This analysis will be conducted for the two enterprises.6 Finally, the results for the
implications regarding the use of various policy instruments to determine the likelihood of
acceptance among landowners to these various instruments and landowner’s willingness to
participate in wetland restoration programs are evaluated. Importantly, an attempt will be made
to tailor these instruments to the specific activities, environments, and characteristics of
landowners in coastal Louisiana.
Federal laws and programs recognize that the best stewards of coastal resources are likely
to be local communities and their citizens.7 State and federal budgets to encourage local

6

As mentioned before, the two enterprises include alligator and waterfowl hunting.
For example, the National Estuary Program (NEP) encourages local communities to take responsibility for
managing estuaries and maintaining the wide range of biophysical, economic, recreational, and aesthetic values of
the systems. Much of the monetary and technical resources for these efforts come from federal and state programs,
such as those established under the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA).
7
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stewardship, however, are relatively small in relation to needs. Consequently, if coastal
restoration and management needs are to be met in Louisiana, public funds must be leveraged to
private investment. Encouraging this private investment can be difficult because of the
uncertainty as to the impact of any project on the income-generating potential of a given project,
the spatially complex nature of expected wetland losses, and the fact that the benefits of wetland
restoration tend to accrue to the public rather than to individual landowners. The overriding goal
of this project is to add to our limited knowledge of coastal wetland income-generating activities
and to use this increased knowledge to help craft restoration program scenarios that are more
likely to be accepted by wetland owners and in which they will be more willing to actively
participate.
1.4 Study Objectives
The overall goal of the proposed research is to develop a theoretical and empirical model
of the factors that motivate private landowners to participate in and generate surface-based
income from their coastal wetland property and, with this understanding, to value potential
policy instruments that provide incentives for private coastal wetlands stewardship. Specific
objectives include:
1. Determine the characteristics of coastal Louisiana landowners, including their attitudes
toward the use of their property for income-generating activities, the actual use of their
wetland holdings as a source of income-generating activities, knowledge and opinions
regarding cost-sharing programs, and their general socioeconomic profile;8

8

More than 5 million acres of coastal wetlands are contained in Louisiana's coastal zone with approximately 80
percent of this 5 million acres held privately. These percentages, in addition to ongoing state-level efforts at largescale restoration, make Louisiana an ideal case-study for empirical application of a private decision-making model.
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2. Determine the physical characteristics of the wetland properties, including type of
wetland, total acreage of different marsh types, and presence of a hunting lodge/camp,
etc.;
3. Estimate, using a double-hurdle modeling approach, the importance of specific property
and landowner characteristics on participation rates and the intensity of participation (i.e.,
the level of income-generating activities) in the two primary enterprises conducted on
coastal Louisiana wetland properties (i.e., alligator and waterfowl hunting enterprises);
and
4. Based on results from the preceding objectives, assess the potential impact of policy
instruments designed to encourage private landowners to participate in cost-sharing and
other federally sponsored projects that would maintain/enhance their coastal wetland
holdings.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and
problem statement, highlighting the study objectives and theoretical and policy related
contributions. To accomplish these objectives, the remainder of the dissertation is organized as
follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature relevant to this dissertation topic, including studies
which analyse those factors that contribute to landowner participation in various programs.
Chapter 3 presents the development of a theoretical model describing a landowner’s participation
decision. The double-hurdle model approach and logic of the research method is presented in
Chapter 4. Issues of survey and data validity are considered in Chapter 5, including sampling
strategy, data collection techniques and a descriptive summary. Chapter 6 presents the empirical
6

results while Chapter 7 provides a brief summary of the findings and evaluates the potential
policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Understanding landowners interest and requirements for participation in incomegenerating activities is one aspect of the planning process. Another aspect of the process is
identifying the private landowner and their wetland characteristics that are conducive to incomegenerating activities. Research exploring private landowners attitudes towards coastal wetland
restoration and maintenance in Louisiana is limited. While limited, some studies have been
conducted that identify those factors considered by private landowners to be important in the
conservation and restoration decision-making process. In general, previous studies indicate that a
landowner’s decision whether to participate in land-related activities (such as ecosystem
conservation and wetland restoration program) is affected by a wide range of economic,
geographic, and sociological factors. To further understand the most important factors
influencing a landowner’s participation decision, this chapter reviews some of public regulations
and academic studies related to various restoration programs. The following section provides
some of the laws and regulations which notably impact wetland conservation. Section 2.3 briefly
reviews the current wetland restoration efforts and potential policy instruments in coastal
Louisiana, while Section 2.4 provides a review of relevant studies that explore factors which
contribute to a landowner’s participation decision process. A brief summary be set up in Section
2.5.
2.2 Policies and Programs Related to Wetland
Over the past 40 years, the U.S. population has increasingly begun to recognize that
wetlands provide a variety of goods and services including water purification, flood protection,
8

shoreline stabilization, and fish and wildlife habitat. The importance of wetlands has been
prioritized, to some extent, by federal, state, and local policies encouraging their protection.
Thus, the policy features and regulatory factors that influence landowners participation must be
considered. A brief introduction of some regulations and programs is given in this section.
The Clean Water Act
Yaich (2011) pointed out that the essential wetland protection legislation was initiated in
1972 with the passage of the Clean Water Act. This Act regulated the dredging and filling of
waters of the United States, including wetlands, and has required the replacement of wetlands
lost to development under a policy now known as “no net loss of wetlands policy”. No net loss
was first adopted as a national policy in 1988 under George H. W. Bush administration. The goal
of the policy is to balance wetland loss due to economic development with wetlands reclamation,
mitigation, and restorations efforts so that each newly impacted wetland has to be replaced with a
wetland of the same size and with similar wetland functions and values (NWPF 1987).9 Section
404 of the Clean Water Act is the primary vehicle for Federal regulation to deal with wetland
issues.
There are a number of U.S. government agencies that are in some way legislatively
mandated to ensure the protection of wetlands. These agencies include: (1) the Department of
Defense, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); (2) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA); (3) the Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); (4) the
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); and (5)

9

Turner et al. (2001) highlight that simple ratios of area do not indicate equivalent replacement of functions based
on different types of mitigation (creation, restoration, enhancement, or preservation) and each different mitigation
type yields different degrees of function and wetland functions expressed by each site can vary greatly.
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and the Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) (Votteler
1996).
The Corps and the EPA share the responsibility for issuing permits to those individuals
who wish to dredge or fill wetlands, and these permits often require “compensatory mitigation”
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (Hough and Robertson 2009). However, the EPA has
the authority to veto the permit if discharge materials at the selected sites would adversely affect
such things as municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational
resources. The FWS and NOAA provide the Corps and the EPA with comments about the
potential environmental effects of pending Section 404 permits. 10
The Farm Bill
The 1985 Farm Bill was the first act that officially established the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) aimed to slow wetland loss to agricultural conversion (Hayden, 1990). The CRP
is a cost-share and rental payment program under the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and is administered by the USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA).
The USDA Forest Service and the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service
(NRCS) provide technical assistance for CRP. NRCS's natural resources conservation programs
provide assistance with respect to reducing soil erosion, enhancing water supplies with
groundwater recharge, improving water quality, increasing wildlife habitat, and reducing
damages caused by floods and other natural disasters (O'Brien, 2008). The CRP encourages
farmers to convert highly erodible cropland or other environmentally sensitive acreage to

10

See Copeland (1999) for more detail.
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vegetative cover, such as cultivated or native bunchgrasses and grasslands, wildlife and
pollinators food and shelter plantings, windbreak and shade trees, filter and buffer strips, grassed
waterways, and riparian buffers.
The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) was established by the 1990 Farm Bill (including
a major change to the CRP) and expanded the list of eligible lands to include marginal pasture
lands converted to wetlands or established as wildlife habitat. The WRP was a voluntary
program offering landowners the opportunity to protect, restore, and enhance wetlands on their
property. NRCS provided technical and financial support to help landowners with their wetland
restoration efforts through WRP.
The new Farm Bill, enacted on February 7, 2014, merged the former Wetlands Reserve
Program, Grasslands Reserve Program, and Farm and Ranchlands Protection Program into a new
program called the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP).11 Funding for wetland
and grassland protection expired Sept. 30, 2013, and the 2014 Farm Bill reinstates funding for
these critical efforts under ACEP (NRCS, 2014). The ACEP provides financial and technical
assistance to help conserve agricultural lands and wetlands and their related benefits. Under the
Wetlands Reserve Easements component, NRCS helps to restore, protect and enhance enrolled
wetlands. Under the wetland reserve enrollment options, NRCS may enroll eligible land through:


Permanent Easements: conservation easements in perpetuity. NRCS pays 100 percent of
the easement value for the purchase of easement and the restoration costs;



30-Year Easement -easements that expires after 30 years. Under 30-year easements,
NRCS pays 50 to 75 percent of the easement value for the purchase of the easement.

11

See Chite (2014) for more detail.
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Additionally, NRCS pays between 50 to 75 percent of the restoration costs;


Term Easements - easements that are for the maximum duration allowed under applicable
State laws. NRCS pays 50 to 75 percent of the easement value for the purchase of the
term easement. Additionally, NRCS pays between 50 to 75 percent of the restoration
costs; or



30-Year Contracts - available only to enroll acreage owned by Indian tribes, and program
payment rates are commensurate with 30-year easements.

Swampbuster
Swampbuster is a provision of the Food Security Act of 1985 (were introduced in the
1985 Farm Bill, with amendments in 1990, 1996 and 2002). The Swampbuster provisions are
intended to discourage the conversion of wetlands to agricultural production use. Farmers will be
ineligible for all or a portion of certain federal farm program benefits, including loans, subsidies,
crop insurance, and price support programs if he/she converting a wetland area to produce an
agricultural commodity after November 28, 1990 unless an exemption applies or the functions of
the wetland that was converted (Lamunyon, 1994).
The Water Bank Act
The Water Bank Act (WBA) represents federal legislation enacted to promote the
preservation of U.S. wetlands (Beckman 1971). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture
to enter into land restriction agreements with landowners and operators to preserve wetlands and
retire adjoining agricultural lands. The agreements (contracts) are entered into for a period of 10
years and can be renewed at the time of expiration. In return, the landowners are entitled to
annual federal payments and the total annual payments were limited to $10 million in any year
12

(Act, Endangered Species 1973). The annual maximum payments increased from $10 million to
$30 million after 1980. Authorized by WBA, the Water Bank Program (WBP) aims to (1)
preserve and improve wetland as habitat for migratory waterfowl and other wildlife; (2) conserve
surface waters; (3) reduce soil and wind erosion; (4) contribute to flood control; (5) improve
water quality; (6) improve subsurface moisture; and (7) enhance the natural beauty of the
landscape.
The North American Wetlands Conservation Act
To preserve North American wetland ecosystems, waterfowl, and the other migratory
birds, fish, and wildlife, the United States Congress passed the North American Wetlands
Conservation Act (NAWCA) in December 13, 1989. This act authorizes a wetlands habitat
program to protect, restore, and manage wetland ecosystems and associated habitats for
migratory birds and other wetland wildlife in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The United
States Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for facilitating these funding. The program
encourages private-public cost-sharing through standard and small grants programs. The
standard grants program supports projects in all three countries and the small grants program
supports only conservation projects in the U.S. Funds contribute towards conservation projects
not eligible to match if it comes from the U.S. federal sources (Wilson et al. 1997).12 The
appropriation authorization for NAWCA may not exceed $75 million for FY 2007 through FY
2012. Funding for NAWCA expired in September 2012.

12

See detail from The North American Wetlands Conservation Act, 16 USC 4401-4413.
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2.3 Wetland Restoration Status in Louisiana
2.3.1 Current Wetland Restoration Efforts in Louisiana
In an effort to address the problem of Louisiana’s coastal land loss, the U.S. Congress
passed the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) in 1990. The
CWPPRA program has allocated more than $1.5 billion for construction and operation of
projects since in 1990. In 1998, the COAST 2050 report estimated that an additional $14 billion
was needed to address Louisiana’s land loss problem. In 2002, the Louisiana Coastal Area
(LCA) Restoration Program requested that $14 billion, but only $1.9 billion was authorized in
2004 through the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). Furthermore, attempts to get
federal royalties from petroleum activities off the state’s outer continental shelf (OCS) were
unsuccessful until 2005, when a one-time payment of $540 million was allocated to Louisiana
under the Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP). In 2007, the Gulf of Mexico Energy
Security Act (GOMESA) approved more OCS revenue, and it is now projected that the state will
receive $210 million annually through 2017 and $650 million annually after 2017. Despite these
increases, the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) recently estimated that $100
billion would be needed to fully integrate coastal restoration and protection (Graves 2009).
Given current sources of projected funding, that means that Louisiana will have only 13% of the
funds needed to accomplish its coastal wetland restoration goals (Wang, 2012).
2.3.2 Potential Policy Instruments in Louisiana
Not all policy options are equally effective in achieving desired social goals given the
alternative enterprises and the influence of different property characteristics and socioeconomic
characteristics on the income-generating potential of coastal property. As differentiation in a
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landowners resources, opportunities, and attitudes increases, the complexity of the response to a
given policy will also increase. This may require that policy instruments be tailored to specific
landowner and property characteristics. In practice, the effectiveness of public goals to
encourage private coastal restoration efforts may depend upon more than just a simple method of
making transfer payments. In particular, it may be more effective to implement a portfolio of
policy instruments to increase the range of options available for private landowners (Caffey et al.
2003). The reason for this is that private landowners with different situations are likely to exhibit
heterogeneous preferences over a range of relevant land use alternatives. A wide range of
management approaches have been proposed for the general problems of land and water
conservation and ecosystem restoration in the United States (USEPA 1999). General categories
of these approaches, with some specific examples relevant to coastal Louisiana, include:


Public land purchases. Federal programs such as the Coastal Wetland Planning,
Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) and the Land and Water Conservation Fund
(LWCF) have enabled the purchase and restoration of a small percentage of the coastal
wetlands in Louisiana. Many private landowners, however, may be reluctant to sell their
properties, preferring other means of achieving restoration goals.



Public purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements. Federal programs
located in the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce provide small levels
of funding for the purchase of conservation easements on private coastal wetland
properties.



Establishing new markets for land. One existing but underutilized approach is the
establishment of wetland mitigation banks through which credits for wetland restoration
can be bought and sold. Another potential approach is the establishment of a market for
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carbon credits; brackish marshes such as those in the Louisiana coastal zone are believed
to have a good potential for carbon sequestration.


Implementing innovative tax incentive programs. One potential incentive scheme
involves severing, where needed, surface and subsurface property rights so that oil and
gas producers may continue to exploit subsurface minerals but also may take advantage
of reduced taxes for undertaking surface restoration efforts. A second example in this
category would be shifting towards the taxing of land activities and not property size
(Seidemann and Susman 2002). This latter approach is a landowner-specific approach
that could be developed and refined using the results of this research.



Subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management. Examples include bounties on the
eradication of nuisance species, such as nutria (Myocastor coypus), an herbivorous rodent
whose behavior is extremely destructive of wetlands. Another example includes
programs to compensate landowners for conserving protected species, such as the US
Fish and Wildlife Service’s Private Stewardship Grants Program.

2.4 General Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation
2.4.1 Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation in Wetland Restoration Programs
While literature examining participation in Federal/State wetland-restoration sponsored
programs among Louisiana landowners is limited, multiple studies have looked specifically at
wetland restoration program participation at a larger scale (i.e., the United States and other
countries) as well as in other states within the United States. Based on county acreage enrolled in
the Wetland Trees Practice of Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Parks and Kramer (1995)
constructed cost schedules for expected acres of wetlands restored to examine the probability of
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farmer participation in wetland restoration programs in the United States. The authors employed
a logit model to identify factors which may influence the decision among farm operators whether
or not to enroll in wetland-related practices. They pointed out that, in general, opportunity costs,
program payments, and land quality were all statistically significant in determining enrollments
and the model explained roughly half of the variability in enrollment. Results from the analysis
suggest that farmers become less likely to participate in wetland restoration program as income
derived from agriculture production increases. The positive and statistically significant
coefficient for government payments variable indicated that the amount of government payments
received per acre is associated with higher participation. The authors suggested that age and
ownership were also important factors in the participation decision. Involvement in wetland
restoration programs was positively related to the age of the farmers as well as the proportion of
land operated by full or part-time farmers.
Pease et al. (1997) randomly selected 305 individuals from 2,500 landowners who
participated in three wetland restoration programs (the WRP, the Emergency Wetland Reserve
Program, and the Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program) within states to determine landowners
attitudes towards wetland restoration for the purpose of outlining potential improvements
associated with future restoration programs. This research explored demographic and farm
characteristics of participants in these program. Most landowners in this survey had small and
medium sized properties, and most landowners earned 20% or less of their income from
farming.13 From this survey, the authors found that wildlife plays an extremely important role in
attracting landowners to restore wetlands. Eighty-four percent of the respondents reported that
providing habitat for wildlife was extremely important in their decision to restore a wetland tract.

13

Around forty percent of landowners owned their property for less than ten years.
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The authors pointed that altruistic considerations pertaining to wildlife, future generations, and
natural beauty were very important factors affecting landowner’s restoration decisions. Although
90% of the landowners in the survey reported receiveing financial assistance for wetland
restoration, only 10% reported this factor to be extremely important in their decision to
participate in wetland restoration. The authors suggest that high variation in the attitudes among
landowners with respect to receiving financial assistance indicated that a reduction in easement
payments or help with restoration would decrease the likelihood of participation. After
examining landowners opinions as to why other landowners do not participate in wetland
restoration activities, the authors found that “dislike of government programs” and “unaware of
restoration programs” were the primary reasons.
Forshay et al. (2005), based on data covering four counties in south-central Wisconsin,
examined ecological monitoring data in relation to perceptions among landowners regarding the
federally funded Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP). As a part of this study, the researchers
surveyed former and current landowners to assess landowner satisfaction with the restoration
process, participation in planning and implementation, reasons to enroll in the WRP, and
activities within the restoration sites. The authors assumed that economic and ecological factors
were related to satisfaction and pointed out that participation in the WRP was influenced by
perceived opportunity costs, program payments, and land quality. Survey results indicated that
an increase in agricultural benefits tended to decrease participation while an increase in the net
benefits of wetland restoration increased participation. Landowners opinions and satisfaction
with the program were also found to influence restoration participation. In addition, the authors
employed logistic and ordinal logistic regression models to identify factors influencing a
landowner’s decision on restoration enrollment. The results indicated that several factors
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motivated landowners to enroll in the WRP including: (1) protection of the environment, (2)
economic incentives, and (3) recreational opportunities. The recreational opportunities reflected
nonmonetary benefits such as recreation and protection of land, and that these nonmonetary
benefits were weighted more heavily than other factors by landowners when deciding whether to
participate in the WRP program.
Concerning risk perception, Dedah (2010) investigated the factors that influence private
landowners to invest in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance activities in Louisiana. He
surveyed private coastal landowners to determine their general socioeconomic characteristics,
attitudes toward risks, attitudes toward wetland conservation, current uses of landholdings, and
previous investments in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. Based on this survey data,
he used two econometric models - the Tobit and double-hurdle model, to determine how various
factors influence the probability and the level of investment in coastal restoration.14 A likelihood
ratio test was then employed to determine which of the two specifications was, from a statistical
viewpoint, more appropriate. Based on the results from the likelihood ratio test, the researcher
concluded that the double-hurdle model was the appropriate model with the implication being
that the decision to invest in wetland restoration and the level of investment are determined by
different processes. The double-hurdle results indicated that degree of risk aversion plays an
important role in landowner’s decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance
activities. Specifically, the level of investment in wetland restoration and maintenance projects
decreases in association with the level of risk averseness exhibited by the landowner.
Furthermore, landowners with properties in risk-prone areas along the coast were found to be
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The Tobit model is based on the assumption that the decision whether or not to invest and the level of investment
are made simultaneously while the double-hurdle model is based on the assumption that the two decisions are
determined sequentially.
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less likely to invest in wetland restoration than among those landowners with properties in less
risk prone areas. In addition, factors including property size, attitudes toward wetland
restoration and maintenance, income related to the property, participation in government
wetland programs, ownership structure, and land use were found to significantly influence a
landowner’s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance in coastal Louisiana.
In an international context, Söderqvist (2003) used a mail questionnaire instrument from
a random sample of 200 Swedish farmers who live in the Kavlinge River drainage basin to
determine the willingness to participate in a catchment-based program for wetland creation in an
agricultural district in Southern Sweden. Based on data obtained from this survey, the author
examined farmer’s motivations to participate in this program using a Probit regression model.
Four groups of explanatory variables, scale of farm operation characteristics, geographical
location of the farm, the farmer’s characteristics, and subjective values and beliefs, were
considered in the model. The results from the Probit regression analysis indicated that
perceptions of public environmental benefits was an important factor influencing a farmer’s
willingness to participate. These perceptions were in turn likely to depend on a farmer’s
knowledge of how nature works and what information he/she had received. The results also
showed that attitudes and perceived advantages and disadvantages were important factors in
determining a farmer’s willingness to participate in the wetland restoration program, while the
factor more associated with farm profitability was not found to significantly influence the
likelihood of participation. The author pointed out that perceived advantages and disadvantages
would have a strong impact if private agricultural benefits were the dominant motive for
participation. In addition, age was found to significantly influence a farmer’s decision. This
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study concluded that besides financial factors, private and public environmental benefits were
also important related to participation decisions.
To quantify perceived costs among landowners within the Prairie Pothole Region of
Saskatchewan in Canada, Yu and Belcher (2011) estimated the compensation required for
private landowners to conserve wetland and riparian zones and evaluated the influence of farm
characteristics and landowner attitudes on conservation decisions. They surveyed a total of 4,110
landowners in two distinct regions and the overall effective response rate for the two study sites
was 6.1% resulting in a total of 212 completed surveys used for economic analysis. Two
econometric models, a binary Probit model and a multinomial Probit model, were employed to
evaluate the willingness to accept compensation for conserving riparian areas based on a
proposed 10-year payment program. Results from the binary and multinomial Probit analyses
suggested that the magnitude of the conservation payment was an important factor driving a
landowner’s conservation adoption decision. A one dollar per acre increase in the annual
conservation payment was found to increase the probability of acceptance of the payment by
0.6% and 0.8% for the binary model and multinomial Probit model, respectively. The variable
farm size was found to significantly influence the likelihood of participation in both models. The
results indicated that landowners of small farms (defined as land area less than average farm size
of 1,719 acres) were more willing to adopt the wetland conservation contract than other
landowners. Farmers perceptions of private costs and benefits associated with the wetlands were
also found to influence attitudes toward conservation. Farmers who believe wetlands are
beneficial and provide a perceived private benefit were found to be more likely to participate in
the conservation program and/or would be willing to do so for a lower payment. The coefficient
associated with the variable wetland important for wildlife was found to be negative and
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significant in the multinomial Probit model, suggesting that landowners who believe that
wetlands are important for wildlife will be less willing to adopt wetland conservation. The
authors found that the age of the landowner did not significantly influence the landowners’
decisions in the binary Probit model, while age was found to significantly and negatively impact
on the probability of adopting wetland and riparian conservation in the uncertain multinomial
response model. This implied that younger landowners were more likely to participate in wetland
conservation program, while older landowners were less likely to adopt wetland and riparian
conservation. This research also suggested that financial incentives might be quite costly and
ineffective if it was the only policy in use.
In the same time period, Zhang et al. (2011) examined the main factors that influence
farmer’s willingness to participate in the conversion of cultivated land to wetlands (CCW)
among farmers in Northern China. A total of 330 households were randomly selected in 11
villages that were chosen from the list of households provided by the Sanjiang National Nature
Reserve (NNR) Administration. This study received a high response rate (94%) by using face-toface interview with a local manager cooperation. Of the distributed questionnaires, 310
completed surveys were returned. Based on the data collected from the questionnaire, a binary
logistic regression analyses was used to determine which factors influenced farmer’s willingness
to participation in the CCW project. The results indicated that age had a negative impact in
explaining the level of participation, implying that older famers were less likely to participate in
restoration project. The level of education was found to have a positive influence on the
probability of participation. Farmers without cultivated land and/or with lower annual income
were also found to exhibit more positive attitudes towards wetland restoration. This study also
suggested that geographical location and the perceived benefits and risks were relevant factors in
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determining participation. The amount of cultivated land and geographical location influenced
the main income sources of local farmers. The results indicated that attitudes whether or not to
support the restoration project were associated with farmers’ agricultural lifestyle and economic
conditions. The results further showed that farmers perceptions towards the benefits and risks
associated with wetland restoration implied that individuals had different perceptions and
attitudes towards the CCW project. Farmers were more positive to the restoration project if they
were aware of the benefits associated with their participation and were more aggressive to the
project if they paid more attention to risks associated with their participation. Furthermore, the
authors pointed out that it would encourage famers participation if the government provide fair
compensation.
More recently, Guan et al. (2015) explored whether a farmer’s willingness to participate
in Poyang lake wetland restoration (the largest freshwater lake in China and one which provides
a large buffer for flood management in several provinces in the Middle and Eastern China as
well as providing wildlife habitat) was influenced by information about wetland functions and
benefits. The in-person interviews, which included a wetland educational video, drawn from a
random sample of 1,009 individuals with farms in and around the wetlands were conducted by
the China Agricultural Survey Service Jiangxi Field Office. Information collected during the
interview process included each farmer’s attitude to participate in wetland restoration program
before and after watching the education video, as well as each farmer’s socioeconomics and
demographics characteristics. In this survey, a farmer’s willingness to participate was measured
in a 5-point Likert scale (with 1 indicating extremely not willing to participate and 5 indicating
extremely willing to participate). The authors first compared the information treatment effect
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using the paired t-test as well as the propensity score matching (PSM) approach.15 This study
suggested that after watching the video, willingness to participate in the restoration project
improved by one level (from “willing” to “extremely willing” with the increase from one level to
the next being statistically significant). Furthermore, ordered Probit and a binary Probit analyses
were conducted to investigate how individual farmer characteristics and/or farmer household
attributes may influence willingness to participate and the information treatment, respectively.
Results from ordered Probit regression analysis indicated that information was found to
significantly and positively affect willingness to participate. In addition, gender, number of
seniors in the household and number of migrant days away from home were found to positively
associate with willingness to participate while number of agricultural laborers in the household
and farmland size were found to negatively associate with willingness to participate. The authors
concluded that education information has a positive effect on the program participation and
suggested that government educational program could effectively enhance farmer participation in
the wetlands restoration program.
2.4.2 Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation in Different Conservation Programs
Aside from the above studies that focused on wetlands, a number of other studies have
been conducted examining those factors leading to participation in various land conservation
programs. Kraft et al. (1996) explored farmer’s willingness to participate in the USDA’s Water
Quality Incentive Program (WQIP), which was held as the centerpiece of the 1990 farm bill’s
nonpoint source reduction mandate. From a selected sample of 2,067 farmers whose properties
are critical for surface or groundwater quality located in ten diverse counties in the Corn Belt
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Propensity score matching (PSM) is a statistical matching approach to estimate the causal effect of a treatment
and to reduce the bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
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Region (Midwestern United States), a total of 770 completed surveys were returned and used for
economic analysis (an overall effective response rate of 37%). Based on this survey data, the
authors employed a binomial logistic regression analysis to determine the factors influencing a
farmer’s willingness to participate in the WQIP. Results from the regression analysis indicated
that (1) farmers' attitudes toward governmental involvement with wetland regulation; (2)
education; (3) tenure status; (4) contact with Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS);
and (5) percentage of farm sales derived from specialty crops were found to significantly
influence the likelihood of participate in the WQIP. Specifically, more educated farmers who had
more positive attitudes toward wetland regulations, who had more contact with an NRCS expert,
and who had a larger percentage of their gross farm income from specialty crops were more
likely to participate in restoration programs. Meanwhile, private landownership was found to
have a positive impact on the willingness to participate in incentive programs. The authors
pointed out that trust plays an important role for landowners to participate in the NRCSsponsored WQIP.
By using the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) annual data from 2001
to 2003, Lambert et al. (2007) determined the factors that influence a farm household’s decision
to participate in conservation programs. A cumulative Probit regression was used to determine
the likelihood of participation. For analysis, the variables including the business, operator, and
household characteristics of farms and three practices group were constructed for comparison
purpose.16 In addition, the authors employed a multinomial logit regression to determine the
factors of farm structure, household, and environmental characteristics that influence a
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See Lambert et al. (2007). These practices included standard practices, decision aids, and
information/management-intensive practices.
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landowner’s decision whether or not to participate in the conservation practices. Results from the
cumulative Probit regression analysis indicated that cattle/dairy, cost/output ratio, tenure, offfarm income share, retired, dual off-farm income, share income with other household, wetland,
and manufacturing share, were found to significantly influence the likelihood of a farm operator
using one or more conservation techniques. Results from the multinomial logit regression
analysis indicated that variables: high value crops, grain crop, hogs, asset turnover ratio,
commodity payments, female operator, operator works off farm, spouse works off-farm, dual offfarm income, retired, and manufacturing, were found to significantly influence the likelihood of
a farm operator participating in conservation practices. This research suggested that smaller
farms and specialty operators were less likely to participate in intensive practices but were more
interested in flexible practices.17 Furthermore, the authors pointed out that the expert advice
plays an important role in prompting participation in specialized conservation practices.
A body of literature also examines those factors hypothesized to influence participation in
forest management and investment decisions among nonindustrial private forest (NIPF)
landowners (Greene and Blatner, 1986; Romm et al. 1987; Bliss and Martin, 1990; Nagubandi et
al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2002; Elwood et al. 2003). Joshi and Arano (2009) extended the
emphasis of landowner studies and investigated landowners participation decision in several
forest management activities.18 The authors used a mail survey from a randomly selected sample
of NIPF landowners of West Virginia and achieved a response rate of 20%. A binary logistic
regression was employed for each of the activities to determine the factors affecting an NIPF

17

Special operators refer to those people who consider themselves retired or whose primary occupation is something
other than farming. Flexible practices refer to those practices that save time and effort and do not require major
changes in established practice (Lambert et al. 2007).
18
These forest management activities include timber harvest, silvicultural activities, property management activities,
and wildlife habitat management and recreation improvement activities (Joshi and Arano 2009).
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landowner’s decision. The results suggested that the model used for property management
activities explained 31% of the variation, while the models explained less than 30% variation for
the other three activities. Meanwhile, variables including landowner characteristics, ownership,
and management characteristics were found to significantly influence the probability of the
participation decisions.19
A study by Matta et al. (2009) observed the willingness among Florida non-industrial
private forest owners to participate in a conservation program that required restrictions beyond
the existing regulations for silvicultural best management practices (BMPs) in return for
financial incentives. The authors used a random sample of 1,500 landowners in four counties in
North Florida who owned at least ten acres of land.20 This research employed a multinomial logit
model to determine the factors affecting the probability of participation. The results from the
regression analysis indicated that age, income, education, years of ownership, property location,
place of residence, and membership of forestry were found to significantly influence
participation. Specifically, more educated younger owners who had a higher incomes and had
more years of forestland ownership were more likely to participate in forest practices.
Landowners who were a member of forestry or conservation organization and lived on the
property and the land located rural area, were found to have a higher probability of engaging in a
conservation program. In addition, the authors found that the mean incentive payment was about
$95 per ha per year and found that the mean willingness to accept payments ranged from $37 to
$151 /ha/year.
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See Joshi and Arano (2009). These variables include age, education, profession, income, ownership size, period of
forestland acquisition, distance of the forestland to the place of residence, whether the forestland was purchased or
acquired through inheritance or as a gift, primary objective of forestland ownership, and presence of a written
forest management plan.
20
See Matta et al. (2009). These counties include Alachua, Putnam, Walton, and Bay.
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In terms of voluntary programs targeting resource conservation on private land,
Kauneckis and York (2009) examined private landowner participation in voluntary forest
conservation programs.21 From a random sample of 7,780 landowners, a total of 490 landowners
were interviewed by a research team in Monroe County with an overall effective response rate of
53%. A binary logistic regression was employed to evaluate the factors that influence the
probability of participation. In order to account for problems associated with endogeneity, two
different two-stage models were employed for mixed agriculture, forest and residential uses
(AFR), and mix forest and residential uses (FR), respectively. Results from the binary logistic
regression analysis suggested that variables: total other acres owned in state, parcel size,
membership in non-forest program, and distance to urban area, were found to significantly
influence the probability of participation in voluntary forest conservation programs. The twostage regression model from AFR land use suggested that variables: total other acres owned in
state, parcel size, membership in non-forest program, distance to urban area, and forest acres,
were found to significantly influence the probability of participation in voluntary forest
conservation programs for AFR land use. The two-stage regression model from FR land use
suggested that variables: total other acres owned in state, membership in non-forest program,
and distance to urban area, were found to significantly influence the probability of participation
in voluntary forest conservation programs for FR land use. The authors pointed out that
landowners who used a parcel for forest, forest with agricultural, and a combination purposes
were found to be less likely to participate in conversation programs than landowners who used
the parcel for residential.
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Forest land use refers to forest uses only (F), forest use combined with residential use (FR), forest with
agricultural use (AF), and a combination of forest, agricultural and residential uses (AFR) (see Kauneckis and York
2009).
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Similar to the voluntary programs examples, a number of factors have been identified as
important regarding ecosystem services conservation efforts. Vignola et al. (2010), in an analysis
of those factors determining participation in a soil conservation program in the Birris watershed
in Costa Rica, surveyed private farmers to determine their general socioeconomic
characteristics, beliefs associated with soil management, attitude toward risk associated with soil
management, and attitude to values associated with soil management variables. Based on this
survey data, the authors used a factor analysis method to determine how various factors influence
the level of soil conservation among three different farmer groups.22 Results from the analysis
suggested that there was a negative relationship between risk perception of impacts of
agricultural activities on erosion and values regarding short-term benefits of erosion with
conservation effort. The results also suggested that variable with interaction terms were found to
significantly influence farmers decisions regarding the soil conservation program. The authors
suggested that an efficient soil conservation program should consider a complex set of factors to
better promote participation among farmers in the region. The authors also suggested that
providing technical assistance plays an important role in promoting participating in soil
conservation practices.
Based on a random sample of 695 farmers, Greine (2015) surveyed pastoralists in the
tropical savanna rangelands in Australia during April-July 2013 f. Based on the survey data, the
author used factor analysis to explain how attitudinal and motivational variables influence
farmers choices whether to participate in conservation contracts focusing on the agrienvironmental (payment-for-environmental services) schemes (AES) across north Australia. A
mixed multinomial logit and latent class (LC) models were used to determine factors (contract
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Three farmer groups were constructed in this analysis based on the location of farmers.
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attributes, business characteristics, and farmer’s motivations and attitudes) that influence the
decision process among farmers.23 The mixed multinomial logit model suggested that contract
attributes were found to significantly influence participation while the LC models showed that
attitudinal profiles were found to influence farmers intentions of undertaking protection contract.
The author pointed out that program education was an important factor in promoting landowner
participation in private conservation and highlighted that motivations and attitudes were
significant in the decision-making process.
2.5 Summary
General factors that influence landowners decisions regarding participation in various
conservation/restoration programs have been reviewed and identified in this chapter. With an
increasing understanding of the importance of wetlands, the United States government provides
rules, regulations, and incentives to guide (and restrict) private landowners regarding
preservation and conservation of wetlands. Cooperation between government agencies and
landholders is a critical component of most policy implementation approaches and these policy
instruments represent key factor in influencing participation decisions among landowners.
In summary, previous researches provide insight on landowners and other stakeholders
perceptions and attitudes towards decisions whether to participate in a given conservation
program and have found that a suite of socio-economic factors are important. The various studies
described in the above literature review give an overall picture of the factors associated with
landowners participation. Economic incentives (program payments), education, wildlife habitat,
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Latent class model is a statistical method to identify unobservable subgroup using categorical and/or continuous
observed variables.
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recreation, and protection had, in general, a positive influence on the participation decisions.
Institutional programs promoting technical assistance and availability of expert advice should be
strengthened given their positive effect.
This chapter discussed the wetland related policy and regulations and focused on
identifying the factors that affected private landowners decisions to participate various land
conservation programs. The next chapter will present the basic theoretical framework for
landowners decision making process.
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a limited view and discussion of the theoretical methodologies that
describe individual participation decision process and will be utilized in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Chapter 2 previously outlined the literature in the area of landowners participation with a
particular focus on the literature that uses survey data. A number of alternative methodologies
used in the current literature were discussed and put forward as options for the analyses of the
landowner survey data. Landowners may have to decide whether they will participate in incomegenerating activities on their property and if so, what is the level of participation maximize their
optimal income derived from these activities over time. The traditional utility theory have been
developed to analyze landowners behavior. The conceptual model of landowners participation in
this dissertation rests on a behavioral theory of utility theory. Section 3.2 presents a brief view of
theoretical framework of utility function used in household’ decision process. Section 3.3
extends the basic utility theory to the expected utility method and Section 3.4 discuss the net
present value rules and the choice of discount rate, while the final section of this chapter gives a
brief summary.
3.2 The Utility Theory
The concept of utility is central to theories of decision making. Utility theory is the
foundation of neoclassical economic demand theory. This theory states that consumption of
goods or services provides satisfaction, or utility, to consumers. With a limited budget constraint
(wealth or income), individuals face the problem that how to allocate purchases out of that
budget constraint to maximize utility. A number of utility theories have been developed to
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analyze households’ behavior. The basic hypothesis of utility maximization is that a rational
household will always choose a most preferred bundle from set of feasible alternatives as long as
certain properties (completeness, transitivity, and non-satiation) are satisfied.
Consider the problem in this research: the rational landowners know when they choose to
participate in income-generating activities on their properties and how much expected income
could be derive from these participation. Landowners seek to make the most of the available
opportunities given the limited resource they face. According to utility theories (Keeney and
Raiffa 1976; Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1982), landowner’s behavior is characterized by a set
of attributes (e.g., physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic characteristics of
the landowner). The landowner assesses his subjective value or utility for each attribute on the
option to participate in income-generating activities. Finally, the overall evaluation of the option
is based on a weighted combination of its utilities, and the option producing the greatest
evaluation is chosen. In microeconomics, the utility maximization problem is the problem
consumers maximize their utility with limited resource. The traditional utility (U) maximization
problem faced by the household can be expressed as

max 𝑈(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛 )

𝑥1 ,⋯,𝑥𝑛

(1)
𝑛

𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑌
𝑖=1

where 𝑝𝑖 is the price of the ith elementary goods, n is the total number of goods, and Y is the
landowner’s income. The idea here is that the individual chooses a vector of inputs x=(x1,…,xn)
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to maximize his/her utility subject to the budget constraint that says he/she cannot spend more
than his/her total wealth. Assume an individual chooses a set of inputs, x, to maximize his/her
utility and there is no set of x’ from the alternative where U(x’) > U(x). Then, the marginal utility
𝜕𝑈

is given by 𝑀𝑈𝑋 = 𝜕𝑥 > 0, which means the additional satisfaction one receives by adding one
𝑖

more unit of a good. In general, utility from adding goods follows a pattern of diminishing
marginal utility. As more and more of a good is added, each new unit gives some utility but less
than the previous unit. Another important term in utility theory is marginal rate of substitution
(MRS). The idea of the marginal rate of substitution is that it is a measure of the willingness of
individuals to trade less of one input for more of the other, keeping their level of satisfaction
constant. If an individual is adding such that his/her utility is maximized, two conditions must be
satisfied. He/she must be spending all of his/her budget (otherwise, she could get more utility by
adding more) and his/her MRS must equal the ratio of prices, Px1/Px2. The price ratio represents
the opportunity cost of one more unit of X1 in terms of X2. So, in words, this last condition
means that he/she must be willing to give up X2 to get X1 at the same rate as the opportunity cost
of X1. This is just another way to say his/her marginal utility per dollar is equal for both
𝑀𝑈

𝑝

goods 𝑀𝑅𝑆 = 𝑀𝑈𝑋1 = 𝑝𝑥1 .
𝑋2

𝑥2

This theory can be used to explain how a landowner to attain his/her maximum utility
under limited budget and other constraints. Applying the utility maximization theory to this
study, landowners maximize their utility (level of income derived from income-generating
activities) subject to the physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic
characteristics of the landowner constraints. And landowners will achieve his/her maximum
utility given that the certain conditions met (e.g., marginal utility of one input over another one
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equal to the price ratio). The neoclassical theory predicts that consumer demand will represent
this optimizing behavior for all goods and services under their limited budget. This model does a
good job of representing the incentives facing individuals and adjustments individuals make in
response to changes in prices, income where risk and uncertainty are not usually mentioned
(Kahneman and Thaler 2006). The maximization problem, however, is presented as static in this
case. That is, the budget is exhausted entirely with current purchases in order to maximize
current utility. So there is no sense of forward-looking decisions or savings out of a budget in
order to provide future utility. Further, this static framework is limiting if individuals want to talk
about decisions today which generate or affect utility in the future with uncertainty. In reality,
landowners make their decision to participate in income-generating activities often facing the
conditions of uncertainty, which have effects on the economic decision. Landowners have to
account for the uncertainty from the changes of physical and socioeconomic conditions for their
decision. Therefore, expected utility theory could be more appropriate associated with decision
making process in income-generating activities.
3.3 The Expected Utility
As mentioned, the desired revenue derived from participating in income-generating
activities is subject to different sources of uncertainty including the changes of physical
conditions of property, the changes of socioeconomic status of landowners, the changes of policy
instruments, the changes of market demand, and natural disaster (e.g., hurricane). Suppose a
landowner consider to participate in income-generating activities on his/her properties
(comprised by wetland and other type of land) at time t, let Wt be the total acreage of wetland
used for income-generating activities and assume the uncertainty is the probability of hurricane
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occurrence, h, defined as a random variable.24 The C(Tt; h) is the net cost (include both fixed and
variable costs) associated with the participation and I(Wt; h) represents the optimum annual
income (net income) derived from income-generating activities on his/her wetland parcel.
Based on the expected utility function developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944, 1947, and 1953), the present value of expected utility function can be written as

∞

𝑁𝐸𝑈 = ∫ 𝑒 −𝑟𝑡 𝐸𝑈[𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)]𝑑𝑡

(2)

0

where NEU represents the present value of expected utility, r is the discount rate, and t is the
year. The 𝑈(∙) is the individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and this function
can be generalized to three distinct groups based on their risk preferences. 𝐸𝑈(∙) exhibits risk
aversion if and only if 𝑈(x) is a concave function of x (diminishing marginal utility function).
𝐸𝑈(∙) exhibits risk seeking (or loving) if and only if 𝑈(x) is an increasing function of x
( increasing marginal utility function). 𝐸𝑈(∙) is risk neutral if and only if 𝑈 ∗ (∙) is a concave
transformation of 𝑈(∙) ( a linear utility function). Thus, a landowner will chose to participate in
income-generating activities given that the NEU is positive (i.e., the expected discounted utility
of the derived income exceeds the discounted utility of the costs). The expected value gives a
way to measure the relative value of particular choices when considering risk or uncertainty and
provide useful information to evaluate different choices (Arrow and Lind 2014).

Total acreage of wetland used for income-generating activities is the difference between total acreage of land (Tt)
owned by the landowner and total acres not used (TNt) for income-generating activities (include non-wetland (Nt)
and wetland not used for income-generating activities (WNt)). The non-wetland acreage is zero in the case of total
acreage of land are all wetland.
24
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In the cases some uncertainty or risk involved in a participation decision, individuals
need to adapt this idea to incorporate the probabilistic nature of a range of possible outcomes. As
it stands, expected utility theory is widely used in theoretical and practical analysis. A number of
recent studies have been conducted using this approach associated with landowners decision.
Feder and Onchan (1987) used the expected utility approach associated with the attitude of risk
averse to estimate the impact of land ownership security on farm investment and land
improvements. A few years late, Feder et al. (1992) applied the expected utility framework to
evaluate the importance of factors related to tenure security, farm size, and credit availability in
determining farmers’ decision on agricultural investment. To investigate factors affecting offfarm investment of farm households, Mishra and Morehart (2001) used the framework of von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that recognizes risk and assumed the farmer is to
maximize the expected value of a subject to an income constraint. Based on the expected utility
theory, Adams (1998) explored the effects of remittances on the accumulation of physical assets
in one rural area. In the context of wetland restoration and maintenance, landowners face
substantial levels of uncertainty about how future climatic, economic, and institutional factors
that will affect the level of income derived from participating income-generating activities and
payoffs from their investments. Dedah (2010) employed the expected utility framework through
hypothetical investments distributions with different levels of risk and expected net returns to
measure the risk preferences of landowners. Isik and Khanna (2003) used a nonlinear meanstandard deviation expected utility function to determine the impacts of risk aversion and
uncertainty about weather and soil conditions on the decision to adopt site-specific technologies
and the levels of cost-share subsidies required to induce adoption. Furthermore, the potential
impact of risk aversion on investment decisions in the presence of uncertainty has been
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empirically explored using the expected utility framework (Koundouri et al. 2006; Kim and
Chavas 2003; Antle 1983).
Although the expected utility approach has been widely used and accepted in various
scenarios, it is not without its flaws. In particular, many experiments have shown that people
routinely violate the behavioral axioms (Quiggin, 1982; Machina 2009). Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) pointed out that among other things, how preferences of individuals are inconsistent
among same choices, depending on how those choices are presented in their prospect theory.
Anand (1995) stated that rationality does not require transitivity, independence or completeness
and argued that despite the normative and evidential difficulties the general theory of decisionmaking based on expected utility is an insightful first order approximation that highlights some
important fundamental principles of choice, even if it imposes conceptual and technical limits on
analysis which need to be relaxed in real world settings where knowledge is less certain or
preferences are more sophisticated. Despite arguments shown that expected utility theory have
some shortcoming, the expected utility model could be used as the basic model for landowners
decision to participating in income-generating activities in this study.
Assume landowners can maximize the expected present value of net income from
participating in income-generating activities by choosing optimal level of wetland (Wt) used for
these activities. Thus, maximize equation (2) subject constraints that the total acre of wetland
used for income-generating activities is the difference between total acreage of wetland owned
by the landowner and the total acreage of land not used for income-generating activities (i.e.,
Wt= Tt – TNt). The landowner’s optimal expected level of income can be found by solving the
Hamiltonian
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𝐻 = 𝐸𝑈[𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)] + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 )

(3)

Then, the first-order conditions for maximization are

𝐻𝑇̇ 𝑡 = 𝐸 {𝑈 ′ (∙) (

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
−
)} + 𝜆 = 0
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡

̇ = 𝐸 {𝑈 ′ (∙)
𝐻𝑇𝑁
𝑡

𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
}−𝜆 = 0
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡

(4.2)

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ)
}+𝜆 = 0
𝜕𝑊𝑡

(4.3)

𝐻𝑊̇ 𝑡 = 𝐸 {𝑈 ′ (∙)

𝐻𝜆̇ = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 = 0

(4.1)

(4.4)

Rearranging equation (4.1) and substituting lambda with equation (4.2) yields

𝐸 {𝑈 ′ (∙) (

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
−
)} = −𝐸 {𝑈 ′ (∙)
}
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡

(5)

Applying the formulas that Cov(X,Y) = E(XY) - E(X)E(Y), E(X+Y) = E(X) + E(Y), and
Cov(X,Y1+Y2) = Cov(X,Y1) + Cov(X,Y2) yields

𝐸𝑈 ′ (∙)𝐸 (

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
−
−
) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑈 ′ (∙), (
))
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
(6)
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
= −𝐸𝑈 ′ (∙)𝐸 (
) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑈 ′ (∙), (
))
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡

Simplifying equation (6) yields
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𝐸(

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ)
)
𝜕𝑇𝑡

= 𝐸(

𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
)−𝐸(
)
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡

𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑈 ′ (∙),
+

(7)

𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; ℎ)
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; ℎ)
) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑈 ′ (∙), (
)) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑈 ′ (∙), (
))
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡
𝐸𝑈 ′ (∙)

The left-hand side of equation (7) stands for the expected marginal income associated
with the level of wetland used for income-generating activities. The first term on the right-hand
side of equation (7) represents the expected marginal cost associated with total land owned by
the landowner, while the second term on the right-hand side is the expected cost associated with
the land that not used for income-generating activities. The third term on the right-hand side
exhibits landowners preference toward risk. The positive and negative of this term represented
landowners risk preference of risk aversion and risk seeking, respectively. Therefore, risk
aversion landowners would chose to participate in income-generating activities on their wetland
parcels if the expected marginal income associated with the level of wetland used for incomegenerating activities excessed the marginal cost associated with the total land minus the cost
associated with the land that not used for income-generating activities and the additional risk cost
associated with the participation.
3.4 The Net Present Value Rule
A traditional decision making rule is the net present value rule (NPV). The NPV
approach calculates the present value of a series of different future costs and benefits. In the
NPV function, costs and benefits of a project need to be identified with the same units and
appropriate discount rates should be taken into account. Then the NPV can be calculated to make
40

comparison between or among alternatives. Assume Net present value (NPV) is the value of all
projected net benefits in today’s dollar terms from an action (participate in income-generating
activities). The basic ideal of the NPV rule applied to this study is that the landowner should
participate in income-generating activities if the expected income derived from these activities
exceeds the cost of participation; and the landowner will not consider to participate in these
activities if the expected income derived from these activities less than the cost of participation.
Projected net benefits are simply the sum of benefits minus costs in each time period under a
specific discount rate. The equation is given by:

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝐵𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡
𝐵𝑡
𝐶𝑡
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑
=∑
−∑
= 𝑃𝑉𝐵 − 𝑃𝑉𝐶
𝑡
𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑡=0

𝑡=0

(8)

𝑡=0

where Bt is the sum of benefit in time t, Ct is the sum of cost in time t, r is the discount rate and t
is the year. PVB and PVC stand for total present value of benefit and total present value of cost,
respectively.
The major factors affecting present value are the time and the discount (interest) rate. The
change in the discount (interest) rate would have a significant effect on net present value
analysis. In theory, it is not difficult to solve these problems. Comparison can be made between
the costs and benefits when they are discounted. In equation 8, the PVB and PVC received in
time t with discount rate r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1.0). A higher discount rate means a greater preference for
things now rather than later (Hanley and Spash, 1993). The lower discount rate reflects simply a
less intense preference for the present and does not reflect a preference for the future over the
present (Uyar 1993). Although discounting is the most appropriate method for accumulating
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costs and benefits over time, it is sometimes difficult to identify a consensus discount rate when
assessing a project with a long time horizon. If using common discount rates between 4% and
10%, the costs or benefits in a very long time horizon often have little impact on NPV (Holland
et al. 2010).
Following Parks (1993), Zhao and Ziberman (1999), and Dedah (2010) model
specifications, assume a risk neutral landowner consider to participate in income-generating
activities on his/her properties (comprised by wetland and other type of land) at time t, let α be
describe physical characteristics of property and socioeconomic characteristics of landowner that
influence the level of income derived. The C(Tt; α) is the net cost (include both fixed and
variable costs) associated with the participation and I(Wt; α) represents the optimum annual
income (net income) derived from income-generating activities on his/her wetland parcel.
Assume the net income function I(∙) is increasing and concave (e.g., 𝜕𝐼(∙)⁄𝜕(𝑊𝑡 ) > 0 and
𝜕 2 𝐼(∙)⁄𝜕 2 (𝑊𝑡 ) < 0). The landowners can maximize the present value of net income from
participating in income-generating activities by choosing optimal level of wetland (Wt) used for
these activities, to maximize

∞

𝑁𝑃𝐼 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∫ [𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; 𝛼) − 𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; 𝛼)]𝑒 −𝑟𝑡 𝑑𝑡

(9)

0

subject to a constraint that describes the flow of wetland acreage used for income-generating
activities at the end of period 𝑡(𝑊̇ 𝑡 ),
𝑊̇ 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 ;

Landowners optimal level of income can be found by solving the Hamiltonian equation
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𝐻 = [𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; 𝛼) − 𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; 𝛼)] + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 )

(10)

Then, the first-order conditions for maximization are
𝐻𝑇̇ 𝑡 =

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; 𝛼) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; 𝛼)
−
+𝜆=0
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; 𝛼)
−𝜆=0
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡

(11.2)

𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; 𝛼)
+𝜆 =0
𝜕𝑊𝑡

(11.3)

̇ =
𝐻𝑇𝑁
𝑡

𝐻𝑊̇ 𝑡 =

(11.1)

𝐻𝜆̇ = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 = 0

(11.4)

Rearranging equation (11.1) and substituting lambda with equation (11.2) yields
𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡 ; 𝛼) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; 𝛼) 𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡 ; 𝛼)
=
−
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑡
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡

(12)

The left-hand side of equation (12) shows that the marginal income associated with the
level of wetland used for income-generating activities, while the first term on the right-hand side
of equation (12) represents that the marginal cost associated with total land owned by the
landowner (first term) minus the cost associated with the land that not used for incomegenerating activities (second term). Therefore, landowners could optimize the net income by
choosing a level of wetland 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡∗ used for income-generating activities under the conditions
that the marginal income associated with the level of wetland used for income-generating
activities excessed the marginal cost associated with total land minus the cost associated with the
land that not used for income-generating activities.
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3.5 Summary
This chapter provided a brief review on the theoretical analysis of household decisions.
The common assumption is that landowners maximize their utility under a set of constraints.
Based on the theory of utility maximization, landowners make their decision to participate in
income-generating activities subject to the physical characteristics of the property and
socioeconomic characteristics of the landowner constraints. Considering risk and uncertainty,
landowners may have to decide whether they will participate in commercial-based activities on
the wetland property and how to allocate their resources to achieve the optimal income derived
from these activities over time. While the basic principle of utility maximization embodied in
these decision rules underlie all economic models, the specification of net returns will vary with
different decision context. These theories discussed in this chapter provide an organizing
framework for understanding these questions: what are the decisions and how it should be made,
and what are the factors influencing those decisions? The remainder of the dissertation develops
an empirical context to test the theoretical implication. Next chapter will present the empirical
model of landowner decision for participating income-generating activities on the wetland
property.
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CHAPTER 4 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided a discussion of the theoretical considerations with respect
to household decision behavior. This chapter presents the empirical model to estimate the factors
that motivate private coastal landowners to participate in and generate income from their coastal
wetland property. The manner in which wetland owners engage in revenue generating activities
(i.e., alligator and/or waterfowl hunting activities) is expected to be conditioned on two primary
factors: the income-generating characteristics of the property (a function of location and
attributes) and the characteristics of the landowner (including attitudes, opportunity costs, and
ability to actively manage property). Taken together, these categories would be used to
determine whether engaging in a given enterprise activity is considered desirable by a specific
landowner and, if desirable, what is the intensity of participation (i.e., level of income derived)
One main objective of this study is to examine the factors that motivate private coastal
landowners to participate in and generate-income from their coastal wetland parcel. Since some
of the landowners may choose not to participate in these income-generating activities, a portion
of the dependent variables will equal to zero. Elhorst (1993) pointed out that the estimation of
models of farm household investment was complicated since most of data include a large number
of zero values. Including only positive values in dependent variables leads to sample selection
bias and the simple linear regression ordinary least squares (OLS) produces biased and
inconsistent estimates (Elhorst 1993; Worku and Mekonnen 2012). Greene (2008) suggested that
it is necessary to use an approach which can incorporate both discrete and continuous
components.
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To address the statistical issue associated with the dependent variable having a significant
number of zero values, the conventional regression models used a binary dependent variable to
determine these relationship. A number of empirical researchers have looked at factors
influencing private investments decision using the discrete choice models with probit or logit
estimators and, assuming a logistic or normal distribution, estimated the probability of a
household’s decision (Donatos 1995; Mishra and Morehart 2001; Petrick 2004; Romm et al.
1987; Soule et al. 2000; Koundouri et al. 2006; Norris and Batie, 1987; Featherstone and
Goodwin, 1993; Hagos and Holden, 2006). Dedah (2010) pointed that the probit/logit
approaches are useful tools to provide the information on how different characteristics of the
landowners and their wetland tracts influence the probability of investment in wetland restoration
and maintenance. These models, however, while evaluating the factors influencing a landowner’s
decision whether or not to invest fail to provide information about the level of investment in
wetland restoration and maintenance. Since one of the primary objectives of this research is to
determine the factors that motivate private coastal landowners to participate in incomegenerating activities and the factors that affect the level of income derived from theses actives,
the Tobit model, also called censored regression model (Tobin 1958), can handle this problem
and allows for the analysis of the factors affecting the joint decision (Greene 2003). However,
the Tobit model is very restrictive in its parameterization and there are limitations with respect to
the use of this model when the proportion of zero values for the dependent variable is significant.
In the Tobit model, the censored variable (participation) and expected value conditional on the
level of participation are estimated by the same factors. This model considers only the dependent
variable to be censored at zero and ignores the source of zero observations (Newman et al, 2003;
Martinez-Espineira, 2006). Whereas the Tobit model was designed to deal with estimation bias
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associated with censoring, Heckman (1979) pointed out that estimation on selected subsample
results in selection bias. He proposes the two-stage estimation procedure (known as Heckit
model) to deal with the problem associated with the zero observations generated by the nonparticipation decision. The Heckit model overcomes the selection bias by using a full sample
Probit estimation in the first stage, followed by a corrected self-selection estimation carried out
in the second stage. The model assumes that these two stages are affected by different sets of
independent variables and there is no zero observations in the second stage.
Cragg (1971) proposes the double-hurdle model, which generalizes the Tobit model by
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive values.
Similar to Heckit model, the first hurdle refers to the participation decision and the second hurdle
refers to the level of participation decision. Both models allow the possibility of estimating the
first and second stage equations using different sets of explanatory variables. The difference is
that the double-hurdle model permits potential zero values in the second stage. By using a probit
estimator to model the participation decision, zero observations on the dependent variable can be
either attributed to corner solutions or nonparticipation. The double-hurdle model also allows the
decision participating in income-generating activities and the level of income to be treated
separately. Therefore, a separate stochastic process can be used to model the probability of
participation and the level of participation (Carroll et al. 2005).
As mentioned, the first stage of the double-hurdle model, or the first hurdle, in the current
analysis represents the decision by a wetland owner whether or not to participate in incomegenerating activities, while the second stage represents the desired level of income. According to
the assumption of the Heckit model, all the observed observations are positive in the second
stage. In the double-hurdle model, however, there are zero observations which have potential
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positive level of income. In this research, therefore, a double-hurdle model is presented as an
empirical framework to examine the effects of various factors on both participation in and
intensity of participation.
Section 4.2 briefly introduces the underlying theory of the Tobit model. The Heckit
model is discussed in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 outlines the empirical models used in the
study. Section 4.5 discusses model specification, while the last section presents the summary and
conclusion.
4.2 The Standard Tobit Model
The standard Tobit model is defined as
𝑡𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 ; 𝑣𝑖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 )

(13.1)

𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖∗ > 0
𝑡𝑖 = { 𝑖
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(13.2)

where 𝑡𝑖∗ is a latent unobserved endogenous variable which represents landowner i’s desired
level of income for participating in income-generating activities, 𝑡𝑖 is the corresponding observed
variable which measures actual level of income for a landowner i. 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of potential
explanatory variables that influence the landowner’s decisions to participate in incomegenerating activities, and 𝛽 is a vector of the associated parameters to be estimated. In this
model, 𝑣𝑖 is assumed to be a homoskedastic and normally distributed error term. The equation
(13.2) implies that the observed desired level of income are positive continuous value if the
positive level of desired income is realized, and no particular value of 𝑡𝑖 is necessarily observed
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when 𝑡𝑖∗ ≤ 0. Note that since there are no negative values for income, the dependent variable 𝑡𝑖
could be censored at zero without any loss of generality. Therefore, the observed zero on the
dependent variable can be either “true” zero (i.e. due to landowner’s deliberate choice) or
censored zero (i.e. caused by data collection methods). Essentially the Tobit model suggests that
the latent variable 𝑡𝑖∗ represents desired levels of income which for some landowners is
unobservable. These unobserved desired levels of income are transformed to a single value
representing zero level of observed income. The Tobit model therefore assumes that there are
landowners with zero levels of income who would like to participate in income-generating
activities (i.e. have a desired level of income). Compared to an OLS regression, the main
advantage of the Tobit model is using both zero and positive observations. As such, it yields
estimates that are unbiased as well as consistent.
Using maximum likelihood method, the likelihood function of standard Tobit is given by
𝑥𝑖 𝛽
1 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 𝛽
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ ( )] + ∑ ln [ ∅ (
)]
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
0

(14)

+

where “0” under the summation sign denotes the summation over the zero observations in the
sample (level of income 𝑡𝑖 is zero) and “+” indicates summation over the positive observations
(level of income 𝑡𝑖 is positive); Φ(∙) and ∅(∙) denotes standard normal cumulative distribution
function and standard normal probability density function (cdf and pdf), respectively.
4.3 The Generalized Tobit Model (Heckit Model)
As mentioned, to correct the sample selection bias, which arises when interest centers on
the relationship between independent and dependent variables but data are available only for the
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observed positive values of the dependent variable, Heckman (1979) proposes the two-stage
estimation method. The first stage estimates the participation decision and the second stage
estimates for level of participation. According to Heckman (1979) and Flood and Gråsjö (1998),
the standard Tobit model can be modified as
Stage 1: Participation decision
𝑑𝑖∗ = 𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑖 ; 𝑢𝑖 ~𝑁(0,1)

(15.1)

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖∗ > 0
𝑑𝑖 = {
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(15.2)

Stage 2: Level of participation decision:
𝑡𝑖∗ = 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝑣𝑖 ; 𝑣𝑖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 )

(15.3)

𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 1
𝑡𝑖 = { 𝑖
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 0

(15.4)

In this specification, separate sets of factors are assumed to influence the decisions to
participate in income-generating activities and the actual level of income from these activities.
𝑥1𝑖 and 𝑥2𝑖 are vectors of explanatory variables in the two stages of the decision, respectively.
Hence, the model assumes that the decisions of participation and level of participation are
affected by separated sets of factors. These variables are also assumed to be uncorrelated with
their respective error terms (𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 ). As in Tobit model, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are corresponding vectors
of parameters. 𝑑𝑖∗ is a latent variable that denotes binary censoring, 𝑑𝑖 is the observed value
representing the participation decision (i.e. 𝑑𝑖 = 1 implying that the landowner reports
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participation in income-generating activities on his property; otherwise it takes the value zero).
Hence, the actual level of income 𝑡𝑖 equals the unobserved latent value 𝑡𝑖∗ only when a positive
participation decision is reported; otherwise, it takes the value zero. In this case, the error terms
𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are assumed to be normally and independently distributed, which implies that there is
no relationship between the two stages of decision.
Heckman (1979), however, assumes that the two error terms are correlated and the first
stage dominates the second one. Therefore, the error terms follow the bivariate normal
distribution
𝑢𝑖
0
1
( ) ~𝑁 [( ) , (
𝜌𝜎
𝑣𝑖
0

𝜌𝜎
)]
𝜎2

(16)

where 𝜌 represents the correlation coefficient of the error terms. The domination assumption
means the participation is a deliberate choice. Then the model is estimated by Probit for the
decision on participation and standard OLS for the positive participation decisions. The loglikelihood function for the case that the error terms are correlated is given by
𝜌
𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 + 𝜎 (𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2 ) 1 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ (
)] + ∑ ln [Φ (
) ∅(
)]
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
√1 − 𝜌2
0

(17)

+

If the error terms are independent (i.e. ρ=0), then the log-likelihood function is simplified as:
𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1
1 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ (
)] + ∑ ln [Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 ) ∅ (
)]
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
0

+
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(18)

4.4 The Double-Hurdle Model
Cragg (1971) first proposed the double-hurdle model as a generalization of the Tobit
model in the context of analysis of household durable expenditures by allowing the possibility
that a factor might have different effects on the probability of acquisition and the magnitude of
acquisition. It hypothesizes that individuals must pass two separate hurdles before they are
observed with a positive level of consumption.
In this research, the decision process of private landowners can be divided into a twostage decision making process. In the first stage, the wetland owner must decide whether to
participate in income-generating activities (participation decision). Conditional on the outcome
of the first stage, the second stage considers the desired level of income to be forthcoming from
these activities (subject to the characteristics of the property). As noted by Detre et al. (2010),
observing a positive level of income requires that two distinct hurdles be passed with the use of a
latent variable in the first stage allowing for the modeling of the complete decision-making
process. The decision as to whether to participate (stage 1) is expected to reflect the individual’s
perceptions and attitudes toward those factors influencing income-generating activities and is at
least partially based on beliefs by the wetland owner as to whether participation in such activities
would yield a positive return on investment. These beliefs are not directly observed. Instead, a
binary variable denoting whether these beliefs will be positive or negative could be observable
from a survey question asking whether the individual would undertake income-generating
activities under any circumstances. A yes (no) response would indicate whether the individual is
open (or not) to the concept of deriving income from property.
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Given a positive outcome in the first phase, the landowner decides in the second phase
the desired level of income generating activities subject to the physical characteristics of the
property. The desired level of income subject to the physical characteristics of the property
(stage 2) may differ from that associated with profit maximization, with the differential
depending (in part) upon the socioeconomic characteristics of the wetland owner.
The decision process above suggests a double-hurdle model with sample selection (Saha
et al. 1994; Shonkwiler and Shaw 1996; Woldehanna et al. 2000; Dhakal et al. 2008; Detre et al.
2010) that is adapted within a Tobit estimator because survey results will likely show that many
landowners generate no revenues from their coastal properties for either or both of the enterprise
activities considered in this study. 25 The double-hurdle extends the standard Tobit and Heckit
models to overcome the zero income. The general equations of the double-hurdle model is
similar as the Heckit model, but there is a slight modification in the equation. Following Jones
(1989), the specification of the double-hurdle model can be expressed as following
Stage 1: Participation decision
𝑑𝑖∗ = 𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑖 ; 𝑢𝑖 ~𝑁(0,1)

(19.1)

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖∗ > 0
𝑑𝑖 = {
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(19.2)

Stage 2: Desired level of income

25

This statement is supported by Roberts et al. (1999) in their analysis of income derived from surface-use activities
among marsh owners.
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𝑡𝑖∗ = 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝑣𝑖 ; 𝑣𝑖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 )

(19.3)

𝑡 ∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖∗ > 0
𝑡𝑖 = { 𝑖
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 0

(19.4)

Finally, the observed level of income is determined as
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ∙ 𝑡𝑖

(19.5)

In this specification, a positive level of income 𝑦𝑖 is observed if 𝑑𝑖∗ > 0 and 𝑡𝑖∗ > 0. This
illustrates the double-hurdle element to the model. 𝑑𝑖∗ is a latent endogenous variable
representing the decision to participate in income-generating activities for landowner i, 𝑡𝑖∗ is a
latent variable representing the level of income for landowner i, 𝑦𝑖 is the observed level of
income for a landowner i. 𝑥1𝑖 is a set of landowner characteristics and beliefs that influence the
landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating activities, 𝑥2𝑖 is a vector of physical
characteristics of the property (e.g., total acres and percent in different wetland types and open
water) that affect the landowner’s level of income. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are vectors of estimable parameter.
In this formulation, (𝑥1𝑖 ; 𝑥2𝑖 ) may contain the same common explanatory variables, although
their corresponding effects on the two hurdle equations might be quite different. 𝑢𝑖 is normalized
to 1 since the outcome of the first hurdle is binary. Both error terms, 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 , are assumed to be
normal and independently distributed and can be written as
𝑢𝑖
0
1 0
( ) ~𝑁 [( ) , (
)]
0 𝜎2
𝑣𝑖
0

(20)

As in the Tobit and Heckit model cases, the independent double-hurdle model is
estimated using maximum likelihood techniques with the log likelihood given as follows,
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𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
1 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 )Φ (
)] + ∑ ln [Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 ) ∅ (
)]
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
0

(21)

+

The first term on the right-hand side denotes the summation over the zero observations in
the sample. It indicates that the zero observations are affected by both participation and level of
participation decisions. This is in contrast with Heckit model which assumes that all zero
observations arise only from the participation decision. The additional term in equation (21),
𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2

Φ(

𝜎

), contributes the effect of possible zero values in the second stage decision in the

double-hurdle model. The first term captures the possibility of observing zero values in the
second stage decision and thus indicating the second stage is represented like a Tobit model.
The second term on the right-hand side indicates summation over the positive observations; this
term expresses the conditional probability distribution and density function coming from
censoring rule and observed positive values (Fabiosa, 2006). In this research, the former denotes
the probability of passing the participation hurdle, and the latter indicates the density of
observing non-zero income from participating in income-generating activities. Estimation of the
above model will empirically determine the importance of economic versus other criteria related
to the income generating potential of coastal wetland properties. It is worthwhile noting that the
second stage of the two-step process represents a modified hedonic model. Thus, based on the
empirical results forthcoming from the model estimation, one can determine the implicit price of
different property characteristics as they relate to income derived from the two enterprise
activities as well as the implicit prices of human capital (e.g. presence of a lodge or blinds).
Furthermore, under the assumption of independent, homoscedastic, and normally
distributed between two error terms, the log-likelihood function of the double-hurdle is the
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summation log-likelihood of Probit model and truncated regression model (McDowell, 2003;
Aristei et al. 2008). The log-likelihood function can be maximized by maximizing the two
components separately (Jones, 1989; McDowell, 2003). The parameter estimates of the doublehurdle model, however, provide little direct information besides indicating the significance of the
explanatory variable and the direction of its influence on the dependent variable. The economic
interpretation frequently focuses on the analysis of the marginal effects of repressors on the
expected value of 𝑦𝑖 for limited dependent variable models (Jones and Yen, 2000). Thus, to fully
understand the magnitude of the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables,
the marginal effects using the maximum likelihood results obtained from the estimated model
need to be explored. Based on different definitions of the expected value of the dependent
variable 𝑦𝑖 , three different marginal effects can be calculated. The unconditional expected mean
(overall effect on the dependent variable) is the one of most interest in this model. This term is
written as 𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥2𝑖 ) and can be decomposed into two parts. By using the McDonald and Moffitt
(1980) decomposition, the unconditional expected value of the double-hurdle model can be
expressed as (Yen and Jensen, 1996)
𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0) ∗ 𝐸(𝑦𝑖 |𝑦𝑖 > 0)

(22)

where 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0) is the probability of income and 𝐸(𝑦𝑖 |𝑦𝑖 > 0) is the conditional expected level
of income. Following Burke’s (2009) notation, the probability of participation is given by
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0⁄𝑥1𝑖 ) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 0⁄𝑥1𝑖 ) = Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 )
The expected value of y, conditional on y>0 is
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(23)

𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥2𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 > 0) = 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝜎 ∗ 𝜆 (

𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
)
𝜎

(24)

∅(∙)

where λ(.) is the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆(∙) = Φ(∙). After substituting equations (23) and (24) into
equation (22), the unconditional expected value of y can be expressed as follows
𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥1𝑖 , 𝑥2𝑖 ) = Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 ) {𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝜎 ∗ 𝜆 (
)}
𝜎

(25)

Taking the first derivative of equations (23), (24), and (25) with respect to the
explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 yields the double-hurdle marginal effects of the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗
on the probability of income, the conditional level of income, and unconditional level of income.
So, the marginal effect of the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 on the probability of income is expressed
as
𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0⁄𝑥1 )
= 𝛽1𝑗 ∅(𝑥1 𝛽1 )
𝜕𝑥𝑗

(26)

where 𝛽1𝑗 is the element of 𝛽1 representing the coefficient on 𝑥𝑗 . The conditional marginal effect
of the explanatory variable xj given that landowners have made a positive level of income is
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥2𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 > 0)
𝑥2 𝛽2 𝑥2 𝛽2
𝑥2 𝛽2
= 𝛽2𝑗 {1 − 𝜆 (
)[
+𝜆(
)]}
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎

(27)

where 𝛽2𝑗 is the element of 𝛽2 representing the coefficient on 𝑥𝑗 . If 𝑥𝑗 𝜖 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , the unconditional
marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj is
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𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥1 , 𝑥2 )
𝑥2 𝛽2
= 𝛽1𝑗 ∅(𝑥1 𝛽1 ) {𝑥2 𝛽2 + 𝜎 ∗ 𝜆 (
)} + Φ(𝑥1 𝛽1 )
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜎
(28)
𝑥2 𝛽2 𝑥2 𝛽2
𝑥2 𝛽2
∗ 𝛽2𝑗 [1 − 𝜆 (
){
+𝜆(
)}]
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎
If 𝑥𝑗 is only determining the probability of y > 0, then 𝛽2𝑗 = 0, and the unconditional
marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj is
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥1 , 𝑥2 )
𝑥2 𝛽2
= 𝛽1𝑗 ∅(𝑥1 𝛽1 ) {𝑥2 𝛽2 + 𝜎 ∗ 𝜆 (
)}
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜎

(29)

On the other hand, if 𝑥𝑗 is only determining the value of y with y > 0, then 𝛽1𝑗 = 0, and
the unconditional marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj is
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝑥1 , 𝑥2 )
𝑥2 𝛽2 𝑥2 𝛽2
𝑥2 𝛽2
= Φ(𝑥1 𝛽1 ) ∗ 𝛽2𝑗 [1 − 𝜆 (
){
+𝜆(
)}]
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎

(30)

From these marginal effects, elasticities for the probability of a positive income, the
conditional level of income, and the unconditional level of income can be derived. In particular,
using equation (22), the elasticity for the unconditional mean with respect to xj can be written as

𝑒𝑗 =

𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 ) 𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖 ) 𝑥𝑗
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 |𝑦𝑖 > 0)
=
+
𝜕𝑥𝑗 𝐸(𝑦𝑖 )
𝜕𝑥𝑗 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 )
𝜕𝑥𝑗
𝐸(𝑦𝑖 |𝑦𝑖 > 0)

(31)

where the first term on the right-hand side denotes the elasticity of the probability of observing a
positive income (𝑒𝑗𝑝 ) and the second term on the right-hand side denotes the elasticity of
conditional income (𝑒𝑗𝑐 ). The elasticities are calculated at the sample means for continuous
variable. For categorical explanatory variables, 𝑒𝑗𝑝 , 𝑒𝑗𝑐 , and 𝑒𝑗 represent the percentage changes
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in probability of a positive value, conditional level and unconditional level when the value of the
variable shifts from zero to one, holding all the other variables constant (Yen and Jones, 1997;
Newman et al. 2003).
4.5 Specification Issues
4.5.1 Heteroskedasticity
The consistency of maximum likelihood estimates for the double-hurdle model are based
on the assumptions of homoscedasticity and the normality of 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 . The homoscedastic
assumption, however, is likely to be violated for these cross-sectional survey data in this
research. The presence of heteroscedasticity in limited dependent variable model would lead to
inconsistent parameter estimates (Maddala and Nelson 1975; Arabmazer and Schmidt, 1981; Lin
and Schmidt, 1984). To overcome this problem, the standard deviation of the error term is
allowed to vary across observations by specifying it as a function of a set of exogenous variables
(Newman et al. 2003 and Aristei and Pieroni, 2008) and defined as
𝜎𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧𝑖 ℎ)

(32)

where zi represents the continuous variables in 𝑥𝑖 (𝑧𝑖 𝜖 𝑥𝑖 ) and h is a conformable vector of
coefficients. The exponential specification is chosen as it imposes the desirable income that the
standard deviation 𝜎𝑖 be strictly positive (Su and Yen, 1996; Yen, 1993; Yen and Jensen, 1996;
Newman et al. 2003). A likelihood ratio test (LR) can be used to test the restrictions (H0: h =0)
against the alternative that is not 0 (H1: h =0). A rejection of this test indicates that the errors are
heteroskedastic.
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4.5.2 Non-Normal Error Structure
The double-hurdle model relies on the assumption of normality of errors, 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 .
Similar to the case of heteroscedasticity, the maximum likelihood estimates will be inconsistent
if the normality assumption is not tenable (Arabmazer and Schmidt, 1982). One way to
accommodate the assumption of normality is by transforming the dependent and latent variables.
The dependent variable was manipulated using a Box-Cox transformation (Jones and Yen, 2000
and Moffatt, 2005).

𝑌𝑇 =

𝑌𝜆 − 1
𝜆

0<𝜆<1

(33)

Note that linear and logarithmic transformation are two special cases in the Box-Cox
transformation above when λ = 1 and λ → 0, respectively. In general, λ would be expected to lie
between these extremes (Moffatt, 2005).
The log-likelihood function for the independent Box-Cox double-hurdle model after
applying the Box-Cox transformation can be written as (Moffatt, 2005):
1
𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2 +
𝜆 )]
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 )Φ (
𝜎
0

(34)
1
𝑌 𝑇 − 𝑥2𝑖 𝛽2
+ ∑ ln [Φ(𝑥1𝑖 𝛽1 )𝑌𝑖𝜆−1 ∅ (
)]
𝜎
𝜎
+

This expression is similar to equation (21) but the use of YT instead of ti in the final term
requires a Jacobian term 𝑌 𝜆−1 to be included (Moffatt, 2005).
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, three main econometric methodologies that could be utilized to
investigate landowners’ decisions concerning participation in income-generating activities have
been reviewed. While the review is intended to be comprehensive of empirical economic models,
it is not comprehensive of empirical household decision models in general. As was seen in
Chapter 2, these models have already been used in the literature to analyze factors affecting
landowner’s participation in wetland restoration programs and different conservation programs.
These models describe a common situation where the dependent variable is zero for a
portion of the population but positive for the remainder of the population. As pointed out in this
chapter, the most commonly applied technique in this case is using the Tobit model, which
assumes that zero observation occur because of a corner solution. This assumption, however,
underlying the Tobit model, may not be applicable in certain situations. Two generalizations to
the Tobit model, Heckman model and Cragg’s double-hurdle model, in particular were outlined
in this chapter. The key similarity between Heckman and double-hurdle model is that there are
two separate decision stages.
As discussed, the underlying assumption that whether there is first hurdle dominance or
not and whether the choice to participate and the level of income are joint or sequential
decisions. The Heckman model assumes that all zero observations are only from participation
decision. Compare to the Heckman model, the double-hurdle allows the zero observations are
affected by both participation and level of participation decisions. The purpose of this study is to
identify the factors that determine both the probability of participating in income-generating
activities and the factors influencing the level of income, which involve two stage decision
61

process. Given the relative merits of each model and previous empirical research, the doublehurdle model appears to most adequately explain landowner’s participation decision and level of
participation in income-generating activities from their wetland property. The next chapter
discusses the survey design and data set that will be used for empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER 5 SURVEY AND DESCRIPTION STATISTICS
5.1 Introduction
Previous chapters discussed the empirical methodologies that could be used to examine
the research problem introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter outlines and describes the data set
that will be used. A landowner’s decision to employ coastal wetlands in income-generating
activities involves a number of factors, including expected net returns from engaging in these
activities, uncertainty as to the outcome of engagement, and an array of socioeconomic
characteristics of the wetland owner (which may also influence his perception of uncertainty).
Under simplified economic theoretical conditions, a landowner will enroll his property in
income-generating activities as long as the net present value of the expected cash flow from
these activities is positive and will utilize the property in such a manner as to maximize profits.
A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that this simplified theoretical model does not
match actual practices in agriculture and forestry, with factors such as risk and conservation
perceptions needing to be considered in order to adequately explain not only participation in an
economic enterprise, but also the intensity of participation.
Since the focus of this study is to determine landowner’s decisions concerning
participation in income-generating activities and the level of participation from their coastal
properties, a detailed analysis requires the use of landowner survey data. In this research, the
survey was implemented using Dillman’s (2011) tailored design method for mail survey. This
survey collected information about a landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating
activities and income derived from this participation. It also provides the physical characteristics
of the property and socioeconomic characteristics of the landowner. Thus, the information from
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this survey is the primary source of data for this study and this chapter will outline the survey in
greater detail. There are two main goals for this chapter. The first is to describe the survey design
and response and the methodology supporting the collection of data in the questionnaire. This is
presented in Section 5.2. The second main objective is to present a descriptive statistics analysis
of response in order to provide a basis for the econometric analysis presented in Chapters 6. This
descriptive analysis is presented in Section 5.3 while Section 5.4 provides a summary of the
survey data.
5.2 Survey Design and Response
5.2.1 Survey Design and Implementation
Champ (2003) pointed out that a mail survey avoids interviewer effects and allows
respondents to complete the survey according to their schedule, and this method is less expensive
than in-person or telephone survey. The questionnaire was developed based on the tailored
design method for mail surveys, which consisted of a booklet questionnaire, a postcard reminder,
and a replacement questionnaire (Dillman 2011). This survey was designed to determine the
physical property characteristics and landowner characteristics that influence the participation
decision (whether the landowner participates in income-generating activities on a specific
property parcel) and the intensity of participation (e.g., revenues generated from the parcel).
After a thorough literature review, several iterations of draft questionnaire were developed over
several months in early 2015 after which time the questionnaire was sent to several of the Sea
Grant extension agents for their review and comments. After making the changes suggested by
the Sea Grant agents, the questionnaire was sent to the Louisiana State University Institutional

64

Review Board Office for approval (IRB NO. E9722 Expires: 01/17/2019).26 The final survey
instrument contained two sections with a total of 23 questions that allowed for quick answers
selected from several categories. The last question was more open-ended, which solicited
respondent’s suggestions and comments on any topics that might not have been adequately
covered in this survey. The final version of the questionnaire is given in Appendix B.
The mailing list of private coastal landowners was obtained from coastal zone parish
assessor’s offices.27 As shown in Figure 1, landowners in these costal parishes might participate
in income-generating activities on their wetland parcels. According to 2014 Louisiana Summary
(Westra 2014), total Louisiana gross farm value of all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl
hunting leases during 2014 were $10.8 million and $33.6 million in, respectively. Total gross
farm value of all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting from the 20 coastal parishes
during 2014 were $9.7 million and $18.4 million which, respectively, account for 89 percent and
55 percent of the state total for these two enterprises.
Due to data and budgetary limitations, only five coastal parishes (Cameron, Lafourche,
Plaquemines, Terrebonne, and Vermilion parishes) were chosen in this study (Figure 5.2).28
Based on records from these five parishes assessor’s offices, a data set on a total of 1,159
wetland parcels include all information on parcel number, primary owner, mailing address, ward,

26

See Appendix A.
The state of Louisiana is divided into 64 parishes, of which 20 parishes are located in Louisiana’s coastal zone
(LDNR 2010). The Louisiana Coastal Zone parishes includes: Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, Iberia,
Jefferson, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St.
Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Terrebonne, Tangipahoa, and Vermilion. This study is interested in the coastal zone
parishes in Louisiana and focus on Cameron, Lafourche, Plaquemines, Terrebonne, and Vermilion five parishes.
28
Total gross farm value of all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting from these five coastal parishes during
2014 were $6.5 million and $17.2 million, which account for 60 percent and 51 percent of the state total and account
for 68 percent and 93 percent of the 20 coastal parishes total for these two enterprises, respectively.
27
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Figure 5.1 Coastal Parishes in Louisiana

Figure 5.2 Study Area Included Landowners in Five Parishes along Coastal Louisiana
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taxable property type, legal description, physical address, parcel items, deeds, and ownership
history.29 From this raw data, a total of 297 wetland parcels was drawn from Cameron parish, a
total of 226 wetland parcels was drawn from Vermilion parish, a total of 257 wetland parcels
was drawn from Terrebonne, a total of 172 wetland parcels was drawn from Lafourche parish,
and a total of 207 wetland parcels was drawn from Plaquemines parish.
Following Dedah (2010), this study stratified landowners into three groups based on the
number of wetland parcels they owned using the 1,159 wetland parcels as the sample frame. The
first group included all landowners with only one wetland parcel. The second group included all
landowners with two wetland parcels, and the third group included all landowners with more
than two parcels (this latter group largely consisting of large corporations). The questionnaire
was not sent to the third group since landowners who own various wetland parcels might make
diverse participation decisions for different activities on different parcels, but the designed
questions for this research is attempt to have landowners pay more attention on alligator harvest
and/or waterfowl hunting activities from a specific wetland parcel. Furthermore, landowners
with three or more parcels may know little about the activities on individual parcels and may
often represent large corporations.
After eliminating duplicate parcels, parcels without mailing addresses, landowners listed
with three or more parcels, and publicly owned properties, the sample was reduced to a total of
941 landowners and this represents the population to which the questionnaire was distributed.30
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the survey address across the five coastal parishes in
29

A ward, by definition, is a subdivision of a local authority area, typically used for electoral purposes. Wards are
usually named after neighborhoods, thoroughfares, parishes, landmarks, geographical features and in some cases
historical figures connected to the area.
30
Survey were sent to 166 landowners in Cameron, 209 landowners in Vermilion, 221 landowners in Terrebonne,
138 landowners in Lafourche, and 207 landowners in Plaquemines parish.
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Louisiana. Property owners in the sample were surveyed to determine their attitudes toward the
use of individual parcels for income-generating activities, attitudes towards cost-share programs,
the actual use of their wetland holdings in terms of the percentage of the parcel being actively
used in income generating activities, surface-based revenues generated from these parcels
(disaggregated by the categories), and their general socioeconomic profile. While research
examining the attributes that lead to income-generating activities from coastal wetland properties
has not been conducted, research in the related agriculture and forestry fields is extensive. Based
upon a review of this research, information associated with the physical characteristics of the
property and socioeconomic characteristics of the landowner were collected for analysis in the
current study. In total, the survey was mailed to a sample size of 941 private landowners. Each
questionnaire sent to landowners with parcels in Cameron, Lafourche, and Terrebonne parishes
included a parcel geographic information system (GIS) map. This GIS parcel map contained
information on, parcel boundary, parcel number, listed acres, wetland types, and parcel location
from google image (see Figure 5.4 for an example of one of these maps). Two separate GIS

Figure 5.3 Number of Participants Surveyed across Five Coastal Parishes in Louisiana
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Figure 5.4 An Example of GIS Map of Wetland Parcel in Coastal Louisiana
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parcel maps were sent to those landowners with two wetland parcels. These GIS maps, however,
were not available for the other two parishes in the study. As such, included in each survey sent
to landowners with parcels in Vermilion and Plaquemines parishes was the parcel assessment
listing. This parcel assessment listing included information on primary owner, mailing address,
ward, legal description, and property class. (See Figure 5.5 for an example of one of these
assessment listing). Two assessment listings were provided to landowners in these two parishes
who were listed as owners of two wetland parcels.

Figure 5.5 An Example of Assessment Listing of Wetland Parcel in Coastal Louisiana
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The process of surveying respondents followed a modified Tailored Design Method
(Dillman 2011). Of the original 941 survey questionnaires, an initial wave of survey packages,
including a cover letter, questionnaire, a GIS parcel map, and a self-addressed postage-paid
envelope, was sent to 525 landowners who own the wetland property in Cameron, Lafourche,
and Terrebonne parishes in January, 2016. Approximately two weeks later a reminder post-card
encouraging landowners to fill out the survey was sent out. Following the same structure, a
second wave of survey was sent to 416 landowners who own the wetland property in Plaquemine
and Vermilion parishes in April, 2016.
5.2.2 Survey Responses
Removing the undelivered questionnaires (a total of 75) resulted in a final sample size of
866 wetland parcels. Of the 866 questionnaires that were initially mailed out, 153 were returned
fully or partially completed by the respondent (including those, which were returned with no
information when the respondents indicated that the ownership of property had changed). The
final response rate was therefore 17.7% (Table 5.1).
The number of responses, by parishes, is shown in Figure 5.6. The parish with the highest
number of responses for this survey was Terrebonne parish (47 respondents), followed by
Vermilion parish (34 respondents), Cameron parish (26 respondents), Lafourche parish (24
respondents), and then Plaquemines parish (22 respondents). The respondents owned a total of
Table 5.1 Survey Responses
Surveys
First mail-wave
Delivered
482
Returned
97
Response rate (%)
20.10

Second mail-wave
384
55
14.60

71

Total mail
866
153
17.70

26

34
47

24

22

Figure 5.6 Number of Responses from Each Study Parish
99,425 acres. In terms of the total wetland acreage controlled by the survey respondents, these
landowners owned approximately 2.9% of the total wetland acreage in Louisiana’s coastal zone
(3.4 million acres). However, much of the wetland acreage throughout the coastal zone is owned
by major corporations and these corporations were purposely excluded from the survey.
5.3 Descriptive Analysis
5.3.1 Characteristics of the Landowner
Table 5.2 presents a summary of the demographic data obtained from the survey. The
majority of landowners were more than 65 years old (62%), followed by these landowners who
were 55 to 64 years of old (25%). About 11% of respondents were 45 to 54 years old. Most
respondents in the survey were male (69%) and 96% of landowners were white.
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Table 5.2 General Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Landowner
Description
Percent (%)
Cumulative percent (%)
Age
Under 25
0
0
25 - 34
0
0
34 – 44
2.07
2.07
45 - 54
11.03
13.10
55 - 64
24.83
37.93
65 or older
62.07
100.00
Gender
Female
31.03
31.03
Male
68.97
100.00
Race
White
96.55
96.55
Asian
0.00
96.55
Native American
0.69
97.24
Black/African American
0.00
97.24
Latino/Hispanic
0.69
97.93
Other
2.07
100.00
Total household income
Under $20,000
4.39
4.39
$20,000 - $39,999
7.02
11.40
$40,000 - $59,999
13.16
24.56
$60,000 - $79,999
9.65
34.21
$80,000 - $99,999
13.16
47.37
$100,000 - $150,000
18.42
65.79
$Over $150,000
34.21
100.00
Education attainment
Less than high school
3.55
3.55
High school degree or equivalent
14.18
17.73
Some college
21.28
39.01
College degree
33.34
72.34
Master degree
7.09
79.43
Doctorate
20.57
100.00
Outdoor enthusiast
Not an outdoor enthusiast
32.41
32.41
An outdoor enthusiast
67.59
100.00
Environmentalist
Not an environmentalist
27.27
27.27
An environmentalist
72.73
100.00
73

As reported in Table 5.2, less than 35% of respondents reported that they had annual
household income of $79,999 or less while 13% of the respondents had annual household
income in the range of $80,000 to $99,999. In addition, about 18% of respondents had annual
household incomes ranging from $100,000 to $150,000 while 34% of the respondents reported
annual household income over $150,000. With respect to education, a third of the survey
respondents reported having a college degree while 20% of the total respondents reported a
doctorate degree. Less than 18% of the total respondents reported a high school degree or less.
About 68% of respondents answered they are an outdoor enthusiast and 73% of respondents
considered themselves to be an environmentalist.
5.3.2 Characteristics of the Property
The respondents indicated that, on average, the relevant property was comprised of 734
acres of freshwater marsh, 510 acres of brackish marsh, 62 acres of salt marsh, and 341 acres of
other land (including open water), respectively (Table 5.3). Overall, survey respondents
indicated that the property had been in family possession for an average of 70 years with a range
from 3 to 150 years (Table 5.3).
Among parcels jointly owned, ownership averaged 27% with a range from 0.3 to 90%
(Table 5.3). The most common ownership structure among respondents was joint ownership
through an undivided heirship (36%) followed by sole ownership (30%) and joint ownership
through a corporation or trust (22%). The remaining 12% of the parcels were owned through
some other ownership structures, such as divided interest and joint through a limited liability
company (Table 5.3). As shown in Figure 5.7, the most common land type reported by
respondents was brackish marsh with approximately a third indicating that their parcel contained
brackish marsh. The second most common wetland type was freshwater marsh (23% of the
74

Table 5.3 Statistical Descriptive of Land Characteristics and Ownership Structure
Description
Mean
Min

Max

Total acreage of freshwater marsh

734

0

6620

Total acreage of brackish marsh

510

0

7370

Total acreage of salt marsh

62

0

1040

Total acreage of other type land

341

0

6570

Years of ownership (year)

70

3

150

Percentage of ownership (%)

27

0.3

90

Ownership type
Sole ownership

Percent Cumulative
(%)
percent (%)
30.14
30.14

Joint ownership through an undivided heirship

35.62

65.75

Joint ownership through a corporation or trust

21.92

87.67

Other ownership

12.33

100.00

Figure 5.7 Wetland Composition by Coastal Landowners
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respondents), followed by salt marsh (about 18% of the respondents). Only 3% of the
respondents reported that the parcel subject to study included other land type (non-wetland).
About 10% and 9% of respondent indicated that their property had both salt and brackish marsh
or had both brackish and freshwater marsh, respectively. In addition, 3% of respondents reported
that their land included all three type of wetland (salt, brackish, and freshwater marsh).
In addition to land ownership and type of wetland, the survey sought to determine the use
of the property for commercial-based activities. About 41% of the respondents reported that they
used their land for some commercial-based activities (Figure 5.8). Following this question,
landowners who reported commercial-based activities were asked to indicate the type of
commercial activity (activities) on their property. About 66% of respondents reported that their
parcel was used for alligator harvest and/or waterfowl hunting activities (Figure 5.9). Primary
commercial-based activities were combined into three categories: (1) alligator harvest (including
egg collection); (2) waterfowl hunting; and (3) other commercial activities. As shown in
Figure5.9, the most common practice was both alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting activities,

Figure 5.8 Landowner’s Responses to Participate in Commercial-Based Activities
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Figure 5.9 Landowner’s Responses about Different Type of Commercial-Based Activities
with approximately 26% of the respondents using their land for these two income-generating
activities. Almost a quarter reported that their parcel was used for other commercial activities
(23%).31 . Approximately 20% of the respondents reported that their parcels were used for
alligator harvest activity only, while 7% of the respondents reported that their parcels were used
for waterfowl hunting activity only. In addition, about 16% of the respondents indicated that they
used the land for alligator harvest, waterfowl hunting, and other commercial activity. The
average income derived from alligator harvest activity among landowners who reported that their
parcels were used only for this activity was $7,030 with a range from $200 to $45,000 (Table
5.4). The average income derived from waterfowl hunting activity (leasing) among landowners
who reported that their parcels were used for only for this purpose was $6,045 with a range from
$500 to $44,000. Average income generated from either or both of these activities were $12,204

31

According to responding landowners, other commercial-based activities include farming, shrimping, crabbing,
grazing, pasture, cattle production, and commercial/industrial land rental for the non-wetland portion of the parcel.
Income derived from activities other than alligator harvest and leasing for waterfowl hunting was not the focus of
this research.
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Table 5.4 Reported Income Derived from Commercial-Based Activities
Description
Mean
Min
Income derived from alligator harvest activity ($)

Max

7,030

200

45,000

Income derived from waterfowl hunting activity ($) 6,045

500

44,000

Income derived from alligator harvest and/or
waterfowl hunting activities ($)

12,204

500

45,000

Income derived from other commercial activities
($)

27,442

0

162,863

with a range from $500 to $45,000. In addition, the average income derived from other
commercial activities was $27,442 with a range of $0 to $162,863. As shown in Figure 5.10,
among respondents who used their parcel for income generating activities (alligator harvest
and/or waterfowl hunting), about 74% indicated that there was no hunting lodge/camp on the
parcel while about two-thirds indicated that they did not actively manage their property for

Figure 5.10 Landowners Responses to Active Management the Wetland Parcel for Waterfowl
Habitat and Presence or Absence of a Hunting Lodge/Camp on the Wetland Parcel
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waterfowl habitat. Finally, 37% of respondents reported that they received sub-surface (oil &
gas) revenue from the parcel of interest (Figure 5.11).

Figure 5.11 Landowners Response to Receive Sub-Surface (Oil & Gas) Revenue

5.3.3 Landowner’s Attitude toward Wetland Restoration Program and Policy Instruments
Landowners were asked if they participate in any state or federal wetland restoration
program on the property specified in the questionnaire. About 10% of respondents indicated that
they participated in some state or federal wetland restoration programs (Table 5.5).
Approximately 34% of these respondents reported that they participated in Wetlands Reserve
Program or Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation & Restoration Act (CWPPRA). About 20%
of the respondents reported that they participated in both Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority (CPRA) and CWPPRA programs. About 13% of these landowners reported that they
Table 5.5 Landowner Participated in State or Federal Wetland Restoration Program
Percent (%)
Cumulative percent (%)
Yes
9.59
9.59
No
90.41
100
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participated in CPRA program, while a third of respondents enrolled in other wetland restoration
programs (e.g., Migratory Bird Habitat Initiative). The majority of respondents (90%) did not
enroll in any wetland restoration programs (Table 5.5). Those landowners who did not
participate in any state or federal wetland restoration programs were asked why they did not opt
to enroll restoration programs and how much importance they placed on these different reasons:
(1) too complicated to apply; (2) don’t want long-term contract; (3) not enough financial
incentive; (4) need the land for other purposes; and (5) ‘other’ reasons (see Appendix B: Q14b).
They were asked to rate (on a 3-point Likert scale) the importance of each of the reasons (Figure
5.12). The majority of landowners reported that ‘other’ reasons were the most important factors
for the decision to participate in state or federal wetland restoration programs. Respondents
reported that ‘other’ reasons included: (1) don’t know anything about the restoration program;
(2) applied but be rejected; (3) have no interest on this matter; (4) living in another state; (5) too
many heirs; and (6) never thought about it. About 96% respondents indicated that they did not

Figure 5.12 Landowners Attitudes Concerning Various Reasons that Influence Their Decisions
to Participate in Wetland Restoration Programs
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know any of wetland restoration programs. More than half the landowner rated that ‘financial
incentive’ was very important. About 42% reported ‘long-term contract’ as being very important
factor in their decision to participate in restoration program. Almost a third of response indicated
that the reason ‘too complicated to apply’ was very important and 38% of the respondents rated
that ‘using the land for other purpose’ was also a very important factor for enrolling a restoration
program. Following this question, the landowners were asked to indicate the importance of the
following current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland restoration in coastal
Louisiana. The listed policy instruments include: (1) public land purchases; (2) public purchase
of permanent or temporary conservation easements; (3) establishing new markets for land; (4)
implementing innovative tax incentive programs; (5) subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife
management; and (7) conservation cost sharing arrangements.32 As shown in Figure 5.13, the
most preferred policy instruments were implementing innovative tax incentive programs and

Figure 5.13 Landowner’s Preference for Various Policy Instruments in Regards to
Wetland Restoration in Coastal Louisiana

32

See Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2) for more detail.
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subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management (47% of the respondents rated both options as
very important). The second most preferred instrument was conservation cost sharing
arrangements, with 46% of the respondents rating cost sharing as very important. Public
purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements was also popular, with about 37 %
of the respondents indicating that this policy instrument was very important. Somewhat less
popular were public land purchases and establishing new markets for land. About 33% and 31%
of the respondents rated these two policy instruments were very important, respectively.
5.4 Summary
This chapter has presented survey design and descriptive statistics of the data set. The
data set will be used to analyze landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating
activities and the level of participation from their wetland parcels in Chapters 6. Coastal parishes
in Louisiana were initially selected for this study and five parishes were selected among 20
coastal parishes due to data limitation. The final mailing list contained a total of 941 wetland
parcels. The household survey covered detailed information on the physical characteristics of
wetland parcels. This includes ownership type and percentage, property size, wetland types,
current land use for any commercial-based activities, total revenue derived from commercialbased activities, and a range of questions about the respondents’ participation of governmentsponsored wetland restoration programs and perspectives. Landowner’s socioeconomic and
demographic information were also collected including age, gender, race, income, education,
annual household income, favorite outdoor activities, and effort in environmental protection. The
description of the survey data provided in Section 5.2 and 5.3 are useful for providing a context
to the work that will be carried out in the subsequent chapters. Definition and summary of
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response and explanatory variables will be discussed in Chapter 6. The next chapter uses this
information, and more, to estimate the empirical double-hurdle model outlined in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an application of Cragg’s (1971) double-hurdle model to analyze
the decision among landowners whether or not to participate in income-generating activities on
their respective coastal wetland parcels and, if so, the intensity of participation. In Chapter 4, the
standard and generalized Tobit models were outlined for comparison purposes. The assumption
is made within the standard Tobit model that landowners make two decisions simultaneously: (1)
whether to participate and (2) the level of participation. The assumption associated with the
generalized Tobit model, on the other hand, is that landowners make the decisions in a two-stage
process where in the first stage landowners make the decision whether or not to participate in
income-generating activities and only after this decision is made do they then determine the level
of participation. As such, the double hurdle model entails a sequential two-stage framework and
considers the probability of zero level of income from potential participants in the second stage.
The key difference between these models is whether zero observations arise solely from nonparticipation or from either non-participation or participation but non-consumption in the first
hurdle stage. Jones (1989) and Garcia and Labeaga (1996) have found that the sequential twostage decision-making process more accurately reflects households’ behavior. Since the
sequential decision-making process incorporates both censoring and selection mechanisms, the
double-hurdle model is, in general, a more flexible modelling framework than the standard and
generalized Tobit models. Dedah (2010) compared the standard Tobit model and double-hurdle
model to determine the characteristics of Louisiana coastal wetland owners, including their risk
preferences, attitudes toward private restoration and maintenance, the actual use of their
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properties, attitudes toward various government incentive programs, and their general
socioeconomic profile using household survey data. He found that the double-hurdle model
statistically outperformed the standard Tobit model. Wodjao (2007) compared the standard and
generalized Tobit models against the double-hurdle model to determine the factors influencing
the use of computer and internet at home using American Time Use survey data. The author
found that the double-hurdle model is the best econometric specification when compared to the
standard and generalized Tobit models.
The empirical results of the double-hurdle model associated with the objectives outlined
in Chapter 1 are presented in this Chapter. In Section 6.2, a brief summary of the key variables
used in the analysis is presented. Model specification is discussed in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4
presents the results of double-hurdle model along with relevant discussion associated with these
results. Empirical simulation is presented in Section 6.5 while a brief summary is provided in the
final section.
6.2 Potential Variables
The following section defines the response and potential explanatory variables for the
econometric models employed in the current analysis. A list of response and explanatory
variables utilized in this study are provided below and descriptive statistics of these variables are
reported in Table 6.1.
6.2.1 Response Variables


Income-generating activities participation is represented by a binary variable (𝑑𝑖∗ ) equal to
1 if the landowner i reports that he/she participated in income-generating activities in 2015
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Table 6.1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Description
Response Variables
Income-generating activities
Participate=1; Else=0
participation
Level of income ($)
Continuous
Explanatory Variables
Socioeconomic/Demographic
Characteristics
Gender
Male=1; Female=0
Race
White=1; Else=0
Age
54 years old or younger=1; Else=0
Education
Some college degree and above =1;
Else=0
Household income ($)
Household_income_1
Under $60,000=1; Else=0
Household_income_2
$60,000 - $99,999=1; Else=0
Household_income_3
Over $100,000=3; Else=0
Land ownership
Sole ownership=1; Else=0
Percentage of ownership
Continuous
Years of ownership
Continuous
Participating in government
Yes=1; No=0
program
Participating in other commercial- Yes=1; No=0
based activities
An active outdoor enthusiast
Yes=1; No=0
An environmentalist
Yes=1; No=0

Property Characteristics
Southeast parish

Hunting lodge/camp (%)
Active management (%)
Receive sub-surface revenues (%)
Land type
Land_type_one

Land_type_two
Land_type_three
Total acreage of freshwater marsh
Total acreage of brackish marsh

Mean

Std.Dev

0.41

0.49

12,204 13,657

0.66
0.97
0.15
0.72

0.47
0.18
0.36
0.45

0.21
0.40
0.39
0.31
0.58
70.87
0.10

0.41
0.49
0.49
0.47
0.40
38.73
0.30

0.14

0.35

0.65
0.68

0.48
0.47

Terrebonne, Lafourche, and
Plaquemines parish=1; Cameron and
Vermilion parish=0
Yes=1; No=0
Yes=1; No=0
Yes=1; No=0

0.66

0.48

0.11
0.13
0.37

0.32
0.34
0.49

Parcels contain one land type=1;
Else=0

0.75

0.43

Parcels contain two land types=1;
Else=0
Parcels contain three land types =1;
Else=0
Continuous
Continuous

0.18

0.39

0.07

0.35

734
510

1,409
1,344
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Table 6.1 continued
Total acreage of salt marsh
Total acreage of other type land

Continuous
Continuous

62
341

205
1,167

and 0 otherwise. From the full sample (N=122), about 41% landowner participated in
commercial-based activities.33


Level of income from income-generating activities is represented by a continuous variable
(𝑡𝑖∗ ), equal to income in dollars for landowner i. The average income among landowners
who participated in commercial-based activities equaled $12,204 with a standard deviation of
$13,657.

6.2.2 Explanatory Variables
Explanatory variables were categorized by the socioeconomic/demographic
characteristics of the wetland owners and physical characteristics associated with the individual
properties. Landowner characteristics included both socioeconomic and demographic variables
as well as variables representing opinions held by the respective landowners.
Socioeconomic/demographic variables included in the analysis are: (1) gender; (2) race; (3) age;
(4) level of education; (5) household income; (6) land ownership; (7) percentage of ownership;
(8) years of ownership; (9) whether the landowner is participating in a government-sponsored
program on the property; and (10) whether the landowner is participating in other commercialbased activities.34 Variables representing opinions held by the landowner include: (1) whether or
not the landowner considers himself/herself to be an outdoor enthusiast; and (2) whether the

33

Commercial-based activities also called income-generating activities, include alligator harvest and/or waterfowl
hunting.
34
As mentioned in Chapter 5, other commercial-based activities include farming, shrimping, crabbing, grazing,
pasture, cattle production, commercial/industrial land rental for non-wetland portion.
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landowner considers himself/herself to be an environmentalist. The physical characteristics of
the property include (1) the location of the parcel; (2) the presence or absence of a hunting
lodge/camp; (3) whether or not the property was actively being managed for waterfowl habitat in
2015; (4) whether the property generates sub-surface revenues; (5) land types; and (6) total
acreage of different land types.
Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics Variables


Gender: For purposes of analysis, gender was coded 1 if a respondent was male and 0 if
female. The influence of gender on participation and the participation level, based on the
literature review presented in Chapter 2, shows that, with notable exceptions, males are
more likely to participate in government-sponsored programs. From this limited review,
it was hypothesized that men are more likely to participate in income-generating
activities on their wetland parcels and that income generated from these activities will be
higher among males.



Race: For purposes of analysis, race was coded 1 if a respondent was white and 0
otherwise. The influence of this discrete variable on whether to participate and the
resultant income associated with this participation is unknown given that there is little
consistency in previous studies.



Age: For purposes of analysis, age was coded 1 if a landowner was 54 years old or
younger and 0 otherwise. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the influence of age on
participation is not consistent across the examined studies. Parks and Kramer (1995), for
example, found that involvement in wetland restoration programs by farmers increase
with age. Söderqvist (2003), on the other hand, found that age had a significantly
negative influence on farmer’s decision to participate in a wetland creation program. Yu
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and Belcher (2011) pointed out that the age of the landowner does not seem to
significantly influence the landowner’s decision to adopt wetland conservation. In this
research, given the inconsistency among studies examining the influence of age on
participation decisions, the expected relationship between age and participation/income in
this study is unknown.


Education: For purposes of analysis, education was coded 1 if a respondent had a college
degree or higher and 0 otherwise. Previous studies suggest that education is an important
factor influencing owner’s participation and income. Zhang et al. (2011), for example,
found that landowners, with a higher level of education, were more likely to participate in
the conversion of cultivated land to wetlands. Kraft et al. (1996) found that an increased
probability of participation in the USDA’s Water Quality Incentive Program by those
landowners who were more educated. Given the noted relationship between education
and participation in previous studies, it was hypothesized for this study that there will be
a positive relationship between education and the likelihood of participation in wetlandgenerating activities as well as a positive relationship between education and the level of
income from participating in commercial-based activities.



Household income: For purposes of this analysis, household income was categorized into
three groups: (1) under $60,000; (2) $60,000 to $99,999; and (3) above $100,000. These
three categories were treated as dummy variables, where the reference group is above
$100,000. The influence of household income on participation is inconsistent in the
studies reviewed in Chapter 2. Matta et al. (2009), for example, pointed out that
landowners with higher incomes would be more willing to adopt the suggested forest
practices. Guan et al. (2015), on the other hand, found that household income exhibited a
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negative impact on the decision to participate in Poyang lake wetland restoration. Given
the inconsistency among studies examining the influence of household income on
participation decisions, the expected relationship between household income and
participation/income in this study is unknown.


Land ownership: For purposes of this analysis, land ownership was coded 1 if the
landowner is a sole owner and 0 otherwise. Parks and Kramer (1995), for example,
pointed that ownership was an important factor in the decision whether or not to
participate in wetland restoration programs in the United States. The authors found that
higher proportions of land operated by full or part owners were both more likely to
become involved in wetland restoration programs. Kraft et al. (1996) also pointed out that
private landownership plays an important role for landowners to participate in the NRCSsponsored WQIP and the authors found that there is a positive relationship between land
ownership and the willingness to participate in incentive programs. It was hypothesized that

landowners who are sole owners exhibit a higher probability of participating in incomegenerating activities and receive more income from participation.


Percentage of ownership: For purposes of this analysis, percentage of ownership (defined
as the percentage of the parcel owned by the landowner from the joint ownership) was
treated as a continuous variable. The expected relationship between percentage of
ownership and whether or not to participate in income generating activities is positive.



Years of ownership: For purposes of this analysis, years of ownership was defined as the
number of years that the property in question was in family possession. The variable of
years of ownership is an important factor related to the participation decision. Matta et al.
(2009) found that longevity of forestland ownership positively influenced willing to
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adopt the suggested forest conservation practices. Based on the findings by Matta et al.
(2009), the relationship between participation and years of ownership in the current study
is expected to be positive. Similarly, a positive relationship between years of ownership
and generated income from commercial-based activities is anticipated.


Participating in a government program: For purposes of this analysis, the variable
participating in government program was coded 1 if the landowner participated in any
state or federal wetland restoration program and 0 otherwise. While enrollment in a
government program is hypothesized to influence the decision to participate in incomegenerating activities, the expected relationship is unknown.



Participating in other commercial-based activities: For purposes of this analysis, the
variable participating in other commercial-based activities was coded 1 if the landowner
participated in any other commercial-based activities and 0 otherwise. While enrollment
in other commercial-based activities is hypothesized to influence the decision to
participate in income-generating activities, the expected relationship is unknown.



An active outdoor enthusiast: For purposes of this analysis, the variable an active outdoor
enthusiast was coded 1 if the landowner considers himself/herself to be an outdoor
enthusiast and 0 otherwise. While a variable of this nature was not included in any of the
studies reviewed in Chapter 2, one might hypothesize that the landowner is more likely to
use the property himself for waterfowl hunting if he considers himself to be an outdoor
enthusiast. Hence, one can hypothesize a negative relationship between
participation/income and whether the landowner considers himself to be an outdoor
enthusiast.
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An environmentalist: For purposes of this analysis, the variable an environmentalist was
coded 1 if the landowner considers himself/herself to be an environmentalist and 0
otherwise. The influence of this discrete variable on whether to participate and the
resultant income associated with this participation is unknown.

Property Characteristics Variables


Southeast parish: For purposes of this analysis, the variable southeast parish was coded 1
if the wetland parcels located in the southeast coastal parishes (i.e., Terrebonne,
Lafourche, and Plaquemines) and 0 for those in the Southwest (i.e., Cameron and
Vermilion). In theory, the influence of this discrete variable on participation and income
should be negligible if the model is well specified. However, given that the quality of the
wetlands in southwest parishes are generally recognized to be of higher quality and this
quality is not considered in the analysis, one can hypothesize that participation and
income generated from this participation is higher in the southwest parishes than in the
southeast parishes.



Hunting lodge/camp: The variable hunting lodge/camp was coded 1 if hunting
lodge/camp is available on the parcel and 0 otherwise. The presence of a hunting
lodge/camp was hypothesized to positively influence the probability of participation and
level of income from the participation.



Active management: The variable active management was coded 1 if the landowner
actively managed his/her wetland property for waterfowl habitat and 0 otherwise.35 It was

35

These management activities include water control, vegetation management through burning, cutting, herbicides,
etc.
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hypothesized that active management would have a positive influence on participation
and level of income from the participation.


Receive sub-surface revenue: The variable receive sub-surface revenue was assigned a
value of 1 if a landowner received any sub-surface revenue from the parcel and 0
otherwise. Whether receive sub-surface revenue from the wetland parcel was
hypothesized to influence both the probability of participating in income-generating
activities and subsequent income.



Land type: The variable land type was categorized into three groups: (1) Land_type_one
denotes the property containing only one land type (i.e., freshwater marsh, brackish
marsh, salt marsh, or ‘other’ land type); 36 (2) Land_type_two denotes the property with
two types of land combination (i.e., property comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish
marsh or property comprised of salt marsh and brackish marsh); and (3) Land_type_three
denotes the property containing three types of land. These three categories were treated as
dummy variables, where the reference group is Land_type_three. The influence of these
discrete variables on whether to participate and the resultant income associated with this
participation are unknown.



Total acreage of freshwater marsh: The variable total acreage of freshwater marsh was
defined as the total freshwater marsh acres on the parcel and treated as a continuous
variable. Parcels used for income-generating activities included in this analysis averaged

36

Salt marshes are coastal wetlands that are flooded and drained by salt water brought in by the tides. Brackish
marshes develop by salt marshes where a significant freshwater influx dilutes the seawater to brackish levels of
salinity. A freshwater marsh is a marsh that contains fresh water. The majority of alligators inhabit freshwater. They
can only handle being exposed to salt water for a small length of time, but will sometimes live in brackish water.
These marshes provide vital food and habitat for several species of migratory waterfowl as well as offering shelter
and nesting sites. ‘Other’ land type refer to non-wetland, including woodland, agricultural land, etc. in this research.
From the survey, the majority of landowner reported ‘other’ land type is agricultural land.
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734 freshwater marsh acres with a standard deviation of 1,408 acres (recall from the
previous chapter that parcels less than 50 acres were purposely excluded from the
analysis). It was expected that landowners who own larger freshwater marsh parcels were
more likely to participate in commercial-based activities in 2015with the amount of
income derived increasing with total parcel acres.


Total acreage of brackish marsh: The variable total acreage of brackish marsh was
defined the total brackish marsh acres on the parcel being considered and is treated as a
continuous variable. Parcels used for income-generating activities included in this
analysis averaged 510 brackish marsh acres with a standard deviation of 1,345 acres. The
expected influence of this continuous variable on participation is positive with the
amount of income derived also being positive. Based on findings by Roberts et al. (1999),
income derived with respect to brackish marsh acreage is expected to be less than that of
freshwater marsh acreage.



Total acreage of salt marsh: As with fresh and brackish marsh, salt marsh (total acreage
of salt marsh) was treated as a continuous variable. Parcels used for income-generating
activities included in this analysis averaged 62 salt marsh acres with a standard deviation
of 205 acres. While total acreage of salt marsh is hypothesized to influence the decision
to participate in income-generating activities, the expected relationship is unknown.



Total acreage of ‘other’ type land: For purposes of this analysis, the variable total
acreage of ‘other’ land type was defined the total non-wetland acres owned by the
landowner and treated as a continuous variable. Parcels used for income-generating
activities included in this analysis averaged 341 non-wetland acres with a standard
deviation of 1,167 acres. Parks and Kramer (1995), for example, found that higher
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benefits derived from agricultural land, the less likely to participate in wetland restoration
programs. Based on this limited literature review, it was hypothesized landowners who
owned ‘other’ type of land are less likely to participate in income-generating activities on
their parcels and receive less amount income derived from these activities.
6.3 Model Specification
6.3.1 Econometric Specification
The vector of coefficients (𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in Equations 15.1, 15.3, 19.1 and 19.3 as presented
in Chapter 4) illustrate the effect on the participation decision and level of participation
respectively, after estimating the Heckit model and the double-hurdle model. In Equations 15.1,
15.3, 19.1 and 19.2, the vector of explanatory variables (𝑥1𝑖 ; 𝑥2𝑖 ) may contain the same
common variables although their corresponding effects on the two hurdle equations might be
quite different.
Unlike the Tobit model, the choice of explanatory variables for participation and level of
participation equations of the Heckit model and double-hurdle is complex. Cragg (1971) did not
provide a choice theory concerning allocation of explanatory variables between the first and
second stages for the double-hurdle model and there is no clear guidance regarding explanatory
variables selection in each of stages. Pudney (1989) suggested that the first hurdle is
unconnected with economic variables and instead arises from social characteristics factors.
Newman et al. (2003) pointed to the fact that variable selection in both stages appears to be
subjective and he suggested that the first hurdle is a function of non-economic factors that
determine the household’s participation decision and that economic variables should be excluded
from the first stage. For purposes of this study, a landowner’s participation decision is assumed
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to be associated with the landowner’s socioeconomic/demographic characteristics and the
landowners’ opinions. The first stage of the process is also augmented with variables
representing the physical characteristics of the parcel. The level of income generated from
commercial-based activities, the response variable in the second stage of the decision-making
process, was assumed to be affected by physical characteristics of the property along with
attributes of the landowner.
Given little guidance as to (a) variables that might be relevant to the decision-making
process and income-generating process and (b) which stage of the two-stage process would be
more appropriate, the choice of explanatory variables for the first and second stage in the Heckit
model and double-hurdle model were determined through a lengthy selection procedure. With
the particular difficulty in the selection of variables, the choice of variable in each stage in most
cases is somewhat arbitrary (Newman et al. 2003). Firstly, following Dedah (2010), the
preliminary Probit and Tobit models were estimated using all potential explanatory variables.
Then, variables were sequentially deleted until no further improvements (based on significance
level of remaining variables) in either the Probit model or the Tobit model (statistically
significant at the 10% level or greater) were forthcoming. Then, comparing the results from the
previous selection process, different combinations of variables from the list of explanatory
variable were reintroduced in the Probit and Tobit models. Thus, the estimation results reported
in this research are based on the final set of explanatory variables that had the most explanatory
power with economic considerations.
Specifically, the following variables were selected for the first stage of analysis (i.e., the
participation decision): (1) age; (2) education; (3) household income; (4) land ownership; (5)
percentage of ownership; (6) years of ownership; (7) participating in other commercial-based
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activities; (8) an active outdoor enthusiast; (9) southeast parish; (10) hunting lodge/camp; (11)
active management; (12) land type; (13) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (14) total acreage of
brackish marsh; (15) total acreage of salt marsh; and (16) total acreage of ‘other’ type land.
Similarly, the following variables were selected for the second stage of analysis (i.e., the level of
participation): (1) age; (2) education; (3) land ownership; (4) years of ownership; (5)
participating in government program; (6) southeast parish; (7) hunting lodge/camp; (8) active
management; (9) land type; (10) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (11) total acreage of
brackish marsh; (12) total acreage of salt marsh; and (13) total acreage of ‘other’ type land. 37
6.3.2 Model Selection
The Tobit model was estimated using the command ‘tobit depvar [indepvars1] [if] [in]
[weight], ll[(#)] ul[(#)] [option]’ and the Heckit model was estimated using the command
‘heckman depvar [indepvars1, select(depvar_s = varlist_s) [twostep]’ in Stata (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2009). The parameter estimates for the Tobit model and the Heckit model with
associated standard errors are reported in Appendix D and Appendix E, respectively. The
double-hurdle model was estimated using Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2012). The Stata 12 does
not have built-in command to run the double-hurdle model. Thus, the log-likelihood function
was estimated by creating a user written program using the command ‘craggit depvar1
[indepvars1] [if] [in] [weight], second (depvar2 [indepvars2]) [option]’ in Stata, which is
described by Burke (2009). To address potential misspecification errors, such as non-normality
and hetroskedasticity, the standard errors were estimated using the robust option ‘vce (robust)’ in

37

The level of income distribution histogram is given in Appendix C.
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Stata (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).38
To identify the model that best estimates the landowner’s participation decision and the
level of income derived from this participation, two model specification tests (the likelihood ratio
test and the Vuong test) were carried out for model selection (Table 6.2).39 First, the likelihood
ratio test was employed to compare the Tobit model against the double-hurdle specification. In
this research, the second hurdle equation of double-hurdle model is a nested version of the Tobit
model if there is no separate participation equation. Thus, the null hypothesis is that the restricted
Tobit model (which use all variable from second stage equation of double hurdle model) fit the
2
data better. The results of LR test statistical value is 𝑥(3)
= 2.93 with a p-value equal to 0.40

(Table 6.2) indicated failing to reject the null hypothesis and suggested the inadequacy of the
univariate Tobit specification in modelling the landowner’s decision process and suggested that
landowners make their decisions in a sequential manner (i.e., in the first stage, landowners make
Table 6.2 Model Specification Statistical Tests
Model comparison
Test method

Test value

P-value

Decision

Double-hurdle model vs. Tobit
model

LR test

2.93 (3)

0.40

Reject Tobit model

Heckit model vs. doublehurdle model

Vuong test

1.08

0.00

Reject Heckit model

Note: The degree of freedom of the chi-square statistics in parentheses

38

Robust standard error is also known as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, White-Huber standard errors, or
sandwich estimators of variance. The procedure deriving robust standard error do not impose any assumptions on
the structure of heteroskedasticity. This is very convenient because it means we can report statistics that work
regardless of the kind of heteroskedasticity present in the population. Whether or not the errors have constant
variance, it is safe to use the robust standard errors (Wooldridge 2015).
39
Likelihood ratio (LR) test is a statistical test used to compare two nested models (the null model and the
alternative model). Each of the two models are separately fitted to the data and the log-likelihood recorded. The LR
test statistic is twice the difference in the log-likelihoods (i.e., 2[ln(likelihood for the full model-ln(likelihood for the
reduced model)]). The test statistic is approximately a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to dffdfr and the preferred model is determined by the probability of the test statistical value. The Vuong test is LR based
test for model selection. It can be used for nested, non-nested, or overlapping model selection.
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the decision to participate in income-generating activities and then consider the desired level of
income derived from this participation). Second, the Vuong test was used to compare the Heckit
model against the double-hurdle model specification. The results of Vuong test statistical value is
1.08 with a p-value equal to zero, indicating rejection of the Heckit model in favor of the doublehurdle model specification in terms of fit (Table 6.2). While the Vuong test showed that the
double-hurdle model outperforms the Heckit model, it can also be explained by the maximum
likelihood estimates. For example, variables: (1) education; (2) land ownership; (3) years of
ownership; (4) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (5) total acreage of salt marsh; and (6) total
acreage of other type of land were found to significantly influence (from a statistical point of
view) the level of income derived from participating in income-generating activities in the
double-hurdle model, but did not significantly influence the level of income in the Heckit model
(Appendix E).
The statistical tests and maximum likelihood estimates indicated that both the Tobit and
the Heckit models are inadequate in explaining the behavior of landowners with the collected
data and suggested that the decision to participate in income-generating activities and the desired
level of income derived from this participation follow a two-step sequential decision process.
Thus, the double-hurdle is the best specification to examine the factors that influence the
likelihood of participation and the level of participation in this research.40
6.4 Results of the Double-Hurdle Model
The results in this section are given in two parts. First, maximum likelihood estimates are

40

An exponential double-hurdle model was also estimated with results presented in Appendix F.
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presented and discussed. Second, in order to assess the impact of the explanatory variables on the
respondent variable, marginal effects are calculated for both continuous and discrete variables.41
6.4.1 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimates
The maximum-likelihood estimates of the double-hurdle model are presented in Table 6.3
with associated robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Estimates for the participation
equation are presented in the second column of the table, while the estimates from the level of
participation equation are presented in the third column. Significant variables in the first hurdle
equation influence the decision whether or not to participate and can be interpreted as increasing
or decreasing the likelihood of participation for income-generating activities.42 A significant
variable in the second hurdle equation indicates an influence on the level of generated income
and can be interpreted as increasing or decreasing income. Since the specification of the doublehurdle model allows for zeros in the second hurdle equation, the estimates are based on both
positive and zero levels of income. The discussion focuses specifically on the significant
variables and their interpretation.
ML Estimates of Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics Variables
Age was found to statistically influence (from a statistical perspective) the likelihood of
participation, but did not significantly influence the level of participation. The influence between
the two stages was of an opposite direction. Specifically, landowners who are 54 years old or

41

Discrete variables can only take on two values, 0 and 1. The AME for discrete variables shows how P(Y=1)
changes as the discrete variable changes from 0 to 1, holding all other variables at their means (Caudill and Jackson,
1989).
42
The explanation is that the focus of the analysis relates only to income-generating activities (i.e. alligator harvest
and waterfowl hunting). For example, a significant negative coefficient should not be interpreted as implying an
increased likelihood of participating in other activities.
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Table 6.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Double-Hurdle Model
First hurdle
Second hurdle equation
equation
Socioeconomic/Demographic
Characteristics
Age
2.14***
-11122.83
(0.71)
(10280.20)
Education
0.18
39689.41***
(0.55)
(13440.96)
Household income
Household_income_one
-0.41
_
(0.58)
Household_income_two
-0.20
_
(0.51)
Household_income_three
Reference group
_
Land ownership
-1.48*
-47164.67***
(0.79)
(17532.87)
Percentage of ownership
1.02
(0.92)
Years of ownership
0.0036
-253.46*
(0.0063)
(135.25)
Participating in government program
_
-12156.48
(11950.24)
Participating in other commercial-based -5.80***
_
activities
(0.75)
An active outdoor enthusiast
-0.68
_
(0.51)
Property Characteristics
Southeast parish
0.41
-7344.87
(0.51)
(8534.06)
Hunting lodge/camp
-2.12***
13738.38
(0.65)
(10937.28)
Active management
10.805***
1059.665
(1.08)
(18022.87)
Land type
Land_type_one
1.99*
6646.70
(1.08)
(11483.01)
Land_type_two
0.12
18773.40
(0.95)
(13107.16)
Land_type_three
Reference group
Reference group
Total acreage of freshwater marsh
0.0044***
11.85**
(0.0017)
(5.45)
Total acreage of brackish marsh
0.0011***
5.83*
(0.0002)
(3.46)
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Table 6.3 continued
Total acreage of salt marsh

-0.0014
2.75
(0.0012)
(17.12)
Total acreage of other type of land
0.0002
13.65***
(0.0002)
(4.75)
Constant
-3.95***
-24968.07
(1.34)
(22406.95)
Sigma
9262.62***
(2008.80)
Wald x2 statistic
1726.19***
Log-Likelihood
-341.51
Number of observation
122
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10
younger were more likely to participate in income-generating activities.
Education was not found to significantly influence the likelihood of participation but it
did significantly influence the level of participation. Specifically, landowners, with a college or
higher level of education, were found to receive more income from income-generating activities.
This supported the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between education and the
level of income.
Land ownership (sole ownership) was found to significantly influence the likelihood of
participation and the level of participation. Specifically, results indicated that sole-owners were
less likely to participate in income-generating activities and received less income than
landowners who own the wetland parcel through joint ownership or ‘other’ ownership structure.
One might hypothesize that this finding reflects a time constraint for a sole owner that does not
allow him to actively adequately monitor activities on the property, thereby, reducing the
probability of him/her actively leasing the property (for waterfowl hunting or the take of
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alligators).43
Years of ownership was found to significantly influence the level of participation, but did
not significantly influence the likelihood of participation. Specifically, the longer the landowner
owned the wetland parcel, the less income the landowner derived from commercial-based
activities.
Participating in other commercial-based activities was found to significantly influence
the likelihood of participation. Specifically, landowners who participated in other commercialbased activities were found to less likely to participate in alligator harvest and/or waterfowl
hunting activities after controlling for other factors.
ML Estimates of Property Characteristics Variables
The presence of a hunting lodge/camp was also found to statistically influence the
likelihood of participation, but did not significantly influence the level of participation. The
influence between the two stages was of an opposite direction. Specifically, landowners who had
a hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel were less likely to participate in incomegenerating activities.
Active management was found to positively and statistically influence the likelihood of
participation but did not significantly influence the level of participation. Specifically, those
landowners who actively managed their property for waterfowl habitat were more likely to
participate in income-generating activities.

43

One might argue that the parcel acreage among sole owners is less than that among joint owners. However, total
acreage of the parcel is represented in the analysis via the summation of the different land types.
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Looking at the land type variables, the results showed that land_type_one significantly
influenced the likelihood of participation, but did not significantly influence the level of
participation. Specifically, landowners who own a wetland parcel with only one land type were
found to more likely to participate in income-generating activities. While the estimated
coefficients for land_type_two was found to not significantly influence (from a statistical
perspective) the likelihood of participation and the level of income generated from participation.
The variable total acreage of freshwater marsh was found to significantly influence
(from a statistical perspective) the likelihood of participation as well as the level of income
generated from participation. Specifically, an increase in acreage of freshwater marsh was found
to result in an increase in participation rate as well as the level of participation (i.e., generated
income from commercial-based activities). This finding was also found with respect to brackish
marsh. Finally, the variable total acreage of other type of land was found to significantly
influence the level of income derived from participation, but did not significantly influence the
likelihood of participation.
6.4.2 Marginal Effects (ME) Estimates
As mentioned in Chapter 4, since the respondent variables from the double-hurdle model
are latent, or unobservable, the maximum likelihood estimates cannot be interpreted in the same
fashion as ordinary least square estimates. The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the
double-hurdle model provide an intuitive interpretation of the factors for determining
landowner’s participation decision and the level of participation. Therefore, to fully understand
the magnitude of the relationship between the explanatory and respondent variables, it is
necessary to explore the marginal effects using the maximum likelihood results obtained from
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the estimated model. Based on different definitions of the expected value of the respondent
variable 𝑦𝑖 , three different marginal effects can be calculated.44 The one of most interest is the
unconditional expected mean (overall effect on the respondent variable) in this model. All of
these marginal effects were estimated using Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2012) and the reported
standard deviations were estimated by using the ‘summarize’ command in Stata. These standard
deviations, however, describe only the data and should not be considered for inference on average
partial effect. Therefore, the standard errors were computed using the delta method with the

‘nlcom’ command in Stata for statistical inference (Su and Yen, 1996).
The estimated marginal effects for these variables, along with their delta-method standard
errors, are presented in Table 6.4. In this table, ‘Probability’ refers to the influence of a change in
the level of an exogenous variable on the probability of participation. A positive value would
imply an increase in the probability of participating in income-generating activities while a
negative value would imply the converse. ‘Conditional’ denotes the level of participation (i.e.,
generated income) associated with a change in the level of any exogenous variable in the model
conditional on participation and, as such, refers only to those landowners who participated in
income-generating activities in 2015. A positive value would therefore indicate that landowners
who received income derived from these activities would receive a higher amount of
participation level (i.e., generated income) with an increase in the exogenous variable of interest
and, vice versa, a decrease in the participation level if that exogenous variable is reduced. The
‘Unconditional’ represents the unconditional effect of a change in the exogenous factor on the

44

The marginal effects referred to the average partial effects (APE), which is an estimate averaged across the sample
observation. As descripted in Chapter 4, the marginal effects can be calculated by differentiating equations (23),
(24), and (25) with respect to each explanatory variable.
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Table 6.4 Marginal Effects with Respect to Continuous and Discrete Variables
Probability
Conditional
Unconditional
level
level
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Age
0.20
-2789.79**
-414.09
(0.26)
(1339.22)
(1079.37)
Education
0.02
9954.77***
4994.59***
(0.21)
(2072.36)
(1055.01)
Household Income
Household_Income_one
-0.04
-186.10
(0.22)
(725.91)
Household_Income_two
0.019
-89.60
(0.19)
(616.68)
Household_Income_three
Reference group Reference
Reference group
group
Land ownership
-0.14
-11829.69***
-6507.78***
(0.29)
(2831.15)
(1866.40)
Percentage of ownership
0.10
457.01
(0.34)
(1185.72)
Years of ownership
0.0003
-63.57***
-29.79***
(0.0024)
(17.88)
(9.18)
Participating in government
-3049.05**
-1505.64***
program
(1339.69)
(473.45)
Participating in other commercial -0.55*
-2605.72
activities
(0.28)
(2609.46)
An active outdoor enthusiast
-0.06
-305.34
(0.19)
(690.45)
Property Characteristics
Southeast parish
0.039
-1842.22**
-727.63
(0.19)
(915.61)
(684.27)
Hunting lodge/camp
-0.20
3445.82***
746.90
(0.24)
(1044.67)
(1292.30)
Active management
1.03**
265.78
4984.59
(0.40)
(1844.50)
(4931.79)
Land type_one
0.19
1667.10
1717.10
(0.40)
(1206.33)
(1725.89)
Land type_two
0.01
4708.68***
2377.99*
(0.35)
(1548.41)
(1233.89)
Total acreage of freshwater marsh 0.0004
2.97***
3.46
(0.0006)
(0.80)
(3.08)
Total acreage of brackish marsh
0.0001
1.46***
1.22*
(0.0001)
(0.47)
(0.68)
Total acreage of salt marsh
-0.0001
0.69
-0.27
(0.0004)
(1.73)
(1.64)
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Table 6.4 continued
Total acreage of other type of
0.00001
3.42***
1.76***
land
(0.00007)
(0.75)
(0.39)
Notes: Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses
Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10
level of generated income (i.e. the total effect) and refers to all landowners (i.e., those who
participated in income-generating activities as well as those who did not). Thus, a positive value
would indicate an increase in the participation level (i.e., generated income) across all
landowners including landowners with zero income from these activities.
It is important to recognize the different interpretations of marginal effect for discrete and
continuous variables under the probability, conditional, and unconditional headings in Table 6.4.
When the value of a discrete variable changes from zero to one, the discrete effect represents the
percentage change in the probability of participation on the probability marginal effect, and it
represents the absolute changes in the conditional and the unconditional level of income. For
continuous variables, the marginal effect represents the unit change in the response variable for a
unit change in the explanatory variable.
ME of Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics Variables
The estimates in Table 6.4 indicated that the probability of engaging in incomegenerating activities was not significantly influenced by the age of the landowner. The estimated
conditional effect was, however, statistically significant and negative (Table 6.4, column 3).
Specifically, the marginal effect with respect to age suggested that conditional on participation,
landowners who are less than 55 years old were found to receive $2,789 less income from
income-generating activities than older landowners. While the conditional effect was statistically
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significant, the estimated unconditional effect was not found to significantly influence the level
of income derived from participation.
The marginal effects with respect to education were positive with respect to both the
conditional and unconditional effects but insignificant with respect to the probability (Table 6.4,
column 2). The positive and statistically significant marginal effects indicated that education
plays an important role on the conditional and the unconditional level of participation (i.e.,
generated income from commercial-based activities). Specifically, conditional on participation,
landowners with more formal education were found to receive $9,955 more income from income
generating activities then landowners with less formal education (Table 6.4, column 3). The
unconditional marginal effect (Table 6.4, column 4) indicated that more educated landowners
were found to receive $4,995 more income from commercial-based activities, on average, than
those landowners with less formal education.
The marginal effects with respect to land ownership (sole ownership) were all negative
but insignificant on the probability (Table 6.4, column 2). The negative and statistically
significant marginal effects indicated that land ownership plays an important role on the
conditional and the unconditional level of participation. Specifically, conditional on
participation, sole-owners were found to receive $11,830 less income than landowners who own
the wetland parcel through joint ownership or ‘other’ ownership structure (Table 6.4, column
3).45 Given the negative effect on conditional level and negative but insignificant effect on
probability, the net effect on unconditional income is (negatively) significant and equal to $6,508
(Table 6.4, column 4). One might hypothesize that the negative effect of sole ownership on

There is a relatively high correlation between ‘sole ownership’ and ‘percentage of ownership’, as one would
expect (0.70) and this correlation may explain the relatively high estimate.
45
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income reflects time constraints among sole owners. Specifically, leasing of property for
waterfowl and/or alligator hunting may require monitoring and other activities to ensure that
lessees are abiding by the agreed upon rules of use. Time constraints for a sole owner may
exceed those in a ‘partnership’ where the various owners can ‘split’ monitoring and other
activities. Another argument that may be advanced is that the fair market value of more
productive properties exceeds that of less productive properties and, as such, would sell for more
in the market place. This being the case, a higher amount of capital may be required to purchase
more productive properties which, in turn, increase the probability of a partnership.
The negative and statistically significant marginal effects indicated that years of
ownership plays an important role on the conditional and the unconditional level of participation.
Specifically, conditional on having made the decision to participate in income-generating
activities, the landowner would receive $64 less income associated with each additional year of
ownership (Table 6.4, column 3). The unconditional marginal effect indicated that for each
additional year of ownership, the landowner would receive $30 less income, on average (Table
6.4, column 4).
The marginal effect with respect to participating in government program indicated that
whether to participate in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs plays a negative
and significant role on the conditional and unconditional level of participation. Specifically,
conditional on participation, landowners who participated in government-sponsored wetland
restoration programs were found to receive $3,049 less income than other landowners (Table 6.4,
column 3). The unconditional marginal effect indicated that landowners who participated in
government-sponsored wetland restoration programs were found to receive $1,506 less, on
average, than landowners who did not participate in a government-sponsored wetland restoration
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program (Table 6.4, column 4). This finding may reflect commercial restrictions placed on
acreage upon enrollment in government programs. This is the case, for example, with acreage
enrolled in the CRP and WRP programs.
The marginal effect with respect to participating in other commercial-based activities
indicated that landowners who participated in other commercial-based activities have a 55%
lower probability of participating in income-generating activities (Table 6.4, column 2). While
the unconditional marginal effect was not found to significant influence the level of income
derived from participation (Table 6.4, column 4).
ME of Property Characteristics Variables
The marginal effect with respect to southeast parish indicated that the location variable
(southeast parish) plays a negative and significant role on the conditional level of income but not
on the probability of participation and unconditional level of income derived from participation.
Specifically, the conditional marginal effect indicated that landowners who own wetland parcel
in southeast of Louisiana were found to receive $1,842 less income (Table 6.4, column 3). This
suggests that location was an important factor in determining the level of income but did not
affect the decision whether or not to participate in income-generating activities. The ‘poorer’
quality associated with wetlands in the Southeast vis-à-vis Southwest may explain this finding.
The hunting lodge/camp variable exerted opposite effects on probability and the level of
participation. With a negative and insignificant sign on probability, landowners who had a
hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel have a 20% lower probability of participating in
income-generating activities (Table 6.4, column 2). The conditional marginal effect indicated
that landowners who had a hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel were found to receive
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$3,446 more income than other landowners (Table 6.4, column 3). However, given the positive
effect on conditional level dominates the negative but insignificant effect on probability, the net
effect on unconditional income is positively insignificant and equal to $747 (Table 6.4, column
4).
The marginal effects with respect to active management was positively and statistical
significant on the probability, but did not significant on the conditional and unconditional levels.
Specifically, the results indicated that landowners who actively managed their wetland parcel for
waterfowl habitat were more likely to participate in income-generating activities (Table 6.4,
column 2).
The marginal effect with respect to land_type_two was positive and statistically
significant on conditional and unconditional level of income. Specifically, the conditional
marginal effect indicated that landowners who own a parcel containing two land types (i.e.,
property comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish marsh or property comprised of salt marsh
and brackish marsh) were found to receive $4,709 more income than other landowners who own
a parcel containing three land types (Table 6.4, column 3). The unconditional marginal effect
indicated that landowners who own a parcel containing two land types were found to receive
$2,378 more income, on average, than landowners who own a parcel containing three land types
(Table 6.4, column 4). Furthermore, the positive but insignificant marginal effect on the
probability of participation suggested that landowners who own a parcel containing two land
types would be more likely to participate in income-generating activities than other landowners
who own a parcel containing three land types (Table 6.3, column 2).
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The marginal effect with respect to total acreage of freshwater marsh indicated that
freshwater marsh plays a positive and significant role on the conditional level of income derived
from participation, but not on the probability of participation and unconditional level of income.
Specifically, the conditional marginal effect indicated that a one acre increase in freshwater
marsh translates into an increase in income of $2.97 more income (Table 6.4, column 3).
However, the positive but insignificant marginal effect on the probability of participation
suggested that if a landowner owns one more acre of freshwater marsh, he/she would have a
0.04% more chance in participating in income-generating activities (Table 6.4, column 2). The
positive but insignificant marginal effect on the unconditional level of income showed that if
freshwater marsh increase one acre, the landowner would receive $3.08 more income, on average
(Table 6.4, column 4).
The marginal effects with respect to total acreage of brackish marsh were all positive but
insignificant on the probability of participation (Table 6.4, column 2). Specifically, conditional
on participation, landowners would receive $1.46 more income per additional acre of brackish
marsh (Table 6.4, column 3). The unconditional marginal effect (Table 6.4, column 4) indicated
that landowners would receive $1.22 more income from commercial-based activities, on average,
as brackish marsh increased by one acre.
Finally, total acreage of other type land were characterized by positive and significant
marginal effects of conditional and unconditional levels. Specifically, the conditional effect
indicated a $3.42 increase in revenue for each additional acre of other land type (Table 6.4,
column 3). The unconditional marginal effect indicated that if other type of land increase one
acre, the landowner would receive $1.76 more income, on average (Table 6.4, column 4).
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6.5 Empirical Simulation
In this research, the final sample is represented by 122 observations. One concern is that
the small sample size may result in a lack of statistical representation of the population and result
in estimates that are inconsistent. Given the small sample size, therefore, an empirical simulation
(resampling) was conducted based on the existing dataset to determine the extent to which the
linear double-hurdle model fits the data (i.e., whether the distributions are centered on the true
value; implying unbiased estimates). Like the Monte Carlo simulation which is a computerized
mathematical technique that involves using repeated random sampling to generate simulated data
and used with a mathematical model to solve problems, the basic idea of empirical simulation is
based on the data generating process (DGP) and estimate the DGP parameters under some
assumptions (e.g., type of distribution) (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).
It is assumed that the distribution of the estimators tends to concentrate at the true
parameter values with an increasing sample size (Qusshim et al. 2016). The double-hurdle model
was evaluated using the empirical simulation. Following Moffatt (2015), the data generating
process is as follows:
First equation
𝑑𝑖∗ = 1 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 3 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 3 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒1 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒2
+ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 3 ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
− 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 4 ∗ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 + 2 ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ + 2
∗ ℎ𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 3 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 4 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒2
+ 3 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓 + 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑏 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖 ; 𝑢𝑖 ~𝑁(0,1)
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(35)

Second equation
𝑡𝑖∗ = 1 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 3 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 3 ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟

(36)

+ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 + 2 ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ + 2 ∗ ℎ𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑒
+ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 3 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 4 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒2 + 3 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓
+ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑏 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑜 + 𝑣𝑖 ; 𝑣𝑖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 )
By the definition of double-hurdle model, the error 𝑢𝑖 is independent of the regressors
and has a mean of zero, variance of one in the first stage decision equation. The error 𝑣𝑖 is
independent of the regressors and normally distributed in the second stage decision equation. To
check the sensitivity of the estimation procedure, the random and arbitrary numerical coefficients
were chosen for each variable in DGP Equations 35 and 36 as the ‘true’ values. Based on the
data set of 122 observations, different sample sizes (n=250, 500, and 1000) were drawn and
estimated. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), the simulation estimates of 𝐸(𝛽̂𝑗 ) is the
̂𝑗 = (1⁄𝑁) ∑𝑁
̂
̂
estimated coefficient ( 𝛽̅
𝑛=1 𝛽𝑗 ) and the simulation estimates of 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽𝑗 ) is the
2
̅
̂
̂
estimated variance (𝑠𝛽̂
= (1⁄(𝑁 − 1)) ∑𝑁
𝑛=1(𝛽𝑗 − 𝛽𝑗 )). The null hypotheses is that in each
𝑗

simulation, the estimated coefficients are equal to the ‘true’ value (i.e., 𝐻0 : 𝛽𝑗 = ′𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒′ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
and the alternative is that in each simulation, the estimated coefficients are not equal to the ‘true’
value (i.e., 𝐻𝑎 : 𝛽𝑗 ≠ ′𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒′ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). A two-tailed t test was used to check the outcome of
𝐻0 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐻𝑎 at the level or nominal size of 0.05 (i.e., the rejection rate, which is the
proportion of simulations that lead to a rejection of 𝐻0 and this proportion is the simulation
estimate of the true test size) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
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For each sample size, the average of estimated parameters, the standard deviation (std.
dev), the average of asymptotic standard error (std.err), and the rejection rate (rej. rate) were
̅̅̅̅̅ = 1.990 in first equation over
̂
calculated and are presented in Appendix G. For example, ̅𝛽
𝑎𝑔𝑒
the 250 estimates, which is very close to the DGP value 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 2.0. The simulation yields a
̂
95% confidence interval for 𝐸(𝛽
𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) of [1.434, 2.532]. This interval is quite wide and includes
2.0 suggesting that the estimator is unbiased. The results shows that the mean of estimated
parameters are close to the ‘true’ value of the DGP in all scenarios as the sample size increases
suggesting the estimated parameters of the double-hurdle model are asymptotically unbiased and
̂
consistent. The ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑠𝑒𝛽
𝑎𝑔𝑒 equals to 0.294 in first equation over the 250 estimates and the 95%
̂
confidence interval for 𝑠𝑒(𝛽̂
𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) is [0.289, 0.295]. Since this interval includes 𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) =
0.294, there is no evidence shows 𝑠𝑒(𝛽̂
. The mean of the asymptotic
𝑎𝑔𝑒 ) is biased for 𝜎𝛽̂
𝑎𝑔𝑒 )
standard errors are close to the standard deviation of estimated parameters suggesting the error
variance is unbiased and consistent. The average rejection rates are converge to 5% suggesting
that there are no significant biases and the asymptotic distribution is approximating the finitesample distribution in all situations. These simulation results indicated that the large sample
theory provides a good approximation to the finite sample distribution.
While the empirical simulation could be used to check if a model fit the data well or not,
as with other mathematical models, it also has its limitations. The advantage of this empirical
simulation is based on the data generating process and estimate the DGP parameters under some
assumptions, this is also its limitation in the sense that assumptions need to be fair. Simulations
can lead to misleading results if inappropriate assumptions and inputs are entered into the model.
As was discussed earlier, the error term from the first equation are assumed to be independent
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with the error term from the second equation. When dependency is considered to the analysis, it
may present another possible result if correlation between two errors is assumed and the
necessary adjustments should be made if the results that are generated seem out of line. While
the empirical simulation does a fine job of illustrating the wide variance of possible results in this
research, there are a number of unknown factors that cannot truly be accounted for.
6.6 Summary
This chapter examined the factors that determine both the probability of participating in
income-generating activities and the level of income generated from the participation based on
the household survey data through a bivariate approach. The LR test and the Vuong test were
employed to compare the double-hurdle model against the Tobit and Heckit models and the
results suggested that the double-hurdle model is the best econometric speciation to examine
landowner’s participation decision and the level of participation. A landowner passes two
hurdles (whether or not to participate in income-generating activities and level of income) to
achieve a positive income value and landowners who participated in these activities might have
zero level of income. Because the specification of the double-hurdle model allows for zeros in
the second hurdle, thus, the double-hurdle model is able to process zero level of income
problems and was carried out to address the issues involved in this research.
The maximum likelihood estimates with robust standard error of the model generated
both significant participation effects and level of income effects which provided a more thorough
examination of the landowners participating decision in income-generating activities. The
maximum likelihood estimation revealed that the likelihood of participation was determined by
most of the variables in the model including: (1) age; (2) land ownership; (3) participating in
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other commercial-based activities; (4) hunting lodge/camp; (5) active management; (6)
land_type_one; (7) total acreage of freshwater marsh; and (8) total acreage of brackish marsh.
The results also indicated that the level of income was determined by the variables: (1)
education; (2) land ownership; (3) years of ownership; (4) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (5)
total acreage of brackish marsh; and (6) total acreage of other type of land.
An overall view of the parameter estimates through maximum likelihood procedure
showed some notable differences in the participation and the level of income equations. First, the
estimates of the effect of age, yeas of ownership, and hunting lodge/camp on participation and
level of income showed different signs. Landowners who are 54 years old or younger were more
likely to participate in income-generating activities but received less income than other
landowners. The longer the landowner owned the wetland parcel, the more likely he/she was to
participate in income-generating activities and the less income the landowner received from
commercial-based activities. Landowners who had a hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland
parcel were less likely to participate in income-generating activities but received more income
than other landowners. The results supported the assumption of the double-hurdle model that a
factor might have different effects on the probability of participation and the level of
participation (descripted in Section 4.4, Chapter 4). Second, the variables such as age, hunting
lodge/camp, active management, and land_type_one were found to significantly influence the
participation decision but did not significantly influence the level of participation. While the
variables education, years of ownership, total acreage of other type of land were found to
significantly influence the level of participation but did not significantly influence the
participation decision. Third, the variables land ownership, total acreage of freshwater marsh,
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and total acreage of brackish marsh were found to be significant in both participation equation
and the level of income equation.
To examine the impact of explanatory variables on the respondent variable, marginal
effects were calculated for probability of participation, the conditional level of income, and the
unconditional level of income. The results from marginal effect estimation revealed that the
variables, participating in other commercial activities and active management were important to
determine the likelihood of participating in income-generating activities. With the exception of a
few variables (active management, land_type_one, and total acreage of salt marsh variables), the
marginal effect estimation suggested that other variables (age, education, land ownership, years
of ownership, participating in government program, southeast parish, hunting lodge/camp,
land_type_two, total acreage of freshwater marsh, total acreage of brackish marsh, and total
acreage of other type of land), were important determinants of level of income for those
landowners who participated in income-generating activities. While the marginal effect
estimation showed that the variables, education, land ownership, years of ownership,
participating in government program, land_type_two, total acreage of brackish marsh, and total
acreage of other type of land, were important determinants of the unconditional level of income
(i.e. overall effect).
It was found that more educated landowners who joint owned the wetland parcel (i.e.,
joint ownership through an undivided heirship or a corporation or trust) and own a parcel
containing two land types were found to receive more income, on average. It was also found that
landowners who own more brackish marsh and other type of land received more income, on
average. One important determinant of level of income was participating in government
program. Landowners who participated in government-sponsored wetland restoration program
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were found to receive less income from commercial-based activities, on average. It also appeared
that landowners who own a wetland parcel located in southeast area in coastal Louisiana and
with longer ownership were found to receive less income.
Next, looking at these common characteristic variables may be of interest when it comes
to discussing potential impact of policy instruments which designed to encourage private
landowners to participate in cost-sharing and other government-sponsored projects. The final
chapter summarizes and discusses the research that has been carried out and presented in this
dissertation.

119

CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
7.1 Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to develop and estimate an economically valid model
that examines those factors that motivate private coastal landowners to participate in incomegenerating activities from their coastal wetland property. The specific objectives included:
1. Determine the characteristics of coastal Louisiana landowners, including their
attitudes toward the use of their property for income-generating activities, the
actual use of their wetland holdings as a source of income-generating activities,
knowledge and opinions regarding cost-sharing programs, and their general
socioeconomic profile;
2. Determine the physical characteristics of the wetland properties, including type of
wetland, total acreage of different marsh types, and presence of a hunting
lodge/camp, etc.;
3. Estimate, using a double-hurdle modeling approach, the importance of specific
property and landowner characteristics on participation rates and the intensity of
participation (i.e., the level of income-generating activities) in the two primary
enterprises conducted on coastal Louisiana wetland properties (i.e., alligator and
waterfowl hunting enterprises); and
4. Based on results from the preceding objectives, assess the potential impact of
policy instruments designed to encourage private landowners to participate in
cost-sharing and other federally sponsored projects that would maintain/enhance
their coastal wetland holdings.
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A landowner’s decision is affected by a number of factors, including expected net returns
from engaging in these activities, uncertainty as to the outcome of engagement, and an array of
socioeconomic/demographic characteristics of the wetland owner and the physical characteristics
of the property. The general decision process of private landowners can be divided into a two
decision-making process. Landowners firstly decide whether to participate in income-generating
activities and then consider the desired level of income derived from these activities. Since many
observed level of income are zero, the linear regression ordinal least square procedures biased
and inconsistent estimates.
Although the traditional Tobit model could be used to handle data with many zeros, this
model is very restrictive in its parameterization and considers only the dependent variable to be
censored at zero and ignores the source of zero observations (Newman et al, 2003; MartinezEspineira, 2006). While the Heckit model use a two-stage estimation procedure to deal with zero
observation, this model assumes that all zero observations are only from first hurdle. The doublehurdle model, however, allows for the zero observation to be affected by both participation and
the level of participation decision. In Chapter 6, the standard and generalized (Heckit model)
Tobit models were used to compare the double hurdle model. The maximum likelihood
estimates, the LR test, and the Vuong test were employed for these comparisons and the results
indicated that the standard and generalized Tobit specifications were rejected in favor of the
double-hurdle model specification. These results also suggested that landowners make their
decision in a sequential decision-making process. A given landowner must first decide whether
to participate in income-generating activities. Conditional on having made the choice to
participate in income-generating activities, the second stage considers the desired level of
income derived from these activities. A landowner passes two hurdles (whether or not to
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participate in income-generating activities and level of income) to achieve a positive income
value and landowners who participated in these activities might have zero level of income.
Because the specification of the double-hurdle model allows for zeros in the second hurdle, this
model is able to process zero level of income problems and was carried out to address the issues
involved in this research. In summary, this research applied the Cragg’s double-hurdle model to
determine landowner characteristics and physical property characteristics that affect participation
(whether the landowner participates in income-generating activities) and level of participation
(e.g., income generated from these activities).
The double-hurdle model with independence was applied to identify the determinants on
the participation and level of participation in income-generating activities using the survey
questionnaire data. The double hurdle results, based on the estimated parameters and marginal
effects, confirmed that decisions to participate in income-generating activities and the level of
income are related to physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic/demographic
characteristics of the landowner. In particular, land ownership, total acres of freshwater marsh,
and total acres of brackish marsh were found have a major impact on respondent variables based
on maximum likelihood estimation. As expected, total acreage of freshwater marsh was
positively related to probability of participation and the level of participation. An increase in
freshwater marsh acreage serves to increase the likelihood of participation in income-generating
activities and an increase in t income. The maximum likelihood and marginal effect estimates
showed that landowners who own the parcel through joint ownership (i.e., joint ownership
through an undivided heirship/a corporation or trust) or ‘other’ ownership structure are more
likely to participate in income-generating activities and would receive more income, on average.
Participation in state or federal wetland restoration programs was an important factor in
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determining a landowner’s level of income. Landowners who participated in government
wetland restoration programs were, on average, found to receive less income from incomegenerating activities than non-participating landowners. Landowners who owned a parcel
containing two land types (i.e., property comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish marsh or
property comprised of salt marsh and brackish marsh) received more income than other
landowners who own a parcel containing three land types, on average. Additional factors, such
as age, education, land ownership, years of ownership, participating in government program,
southeast parish, hunting lodge/camp, land_type_two, total acreage of freshwater marsh, total
acreage of brackish marsh, and total acreage of other type of land were found to be important
factors to determine the intensity of participation (i.e. level of income).46
7.2 Limitations and Further Research


Data Selection and Availability
The sample of data was drawn from five parishes (Cameron, Vermilion, Terrebonne

Lafourche, and Plaquemine parishes) among 20 coastal parishes in Louisiana. Although every
effort was made to obtain all available data for econometric investigation in this research, the
amount of data used for descriptive and empirical statistical analysis is limited. As information
from other parishes becomes available, the analysis could be expanded to include these parishes.
This would yield a larger database from which to conduct analysis.


Alternative Models
The maximum likelihood estimates, the LR test, and the Vuong test suggested that the

46

As defined in Chapter 6, land_type_two denotes the property with two types of land combination (i.e., property
comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish marsh or property comprised of salt marsh and brackish marsh).
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double-hurdle model is the best specification to determine the factors affecting participation and
the level participation decisions at both stages when compared to the standard and generalized
(Heckit model) Tobit models. This research employed the Cragg’s double-hurdle in which the
first hurdle use a Probit model and a truncated normal model in the second hurdle. As discussed
in Chapter 4, there are no restrictions on explanatory variables implying the double-hurdle model
could be determined by different vectors of explanatory variables in each hurdle. Since the
Cragg’s double-hurdle model assumes independence for error distribution, there is an implication
that the results could be sensitive to model misspecification. Thus it would be desirable to
explore dependent double-hurdle model and Box-Cox double-hurdle models for further research.
The study shows that there is an insignificant negative relationship between household
income and the likelihood of participation in the first hurdle of the double-hurdle model.
However, income derived from commercial-based activities are part of annual household income
even if it accounts for only a small part of household income and annual household income may
correlated with other variables and the error term in the first hurdle, which would imply the
potential omitted variable bias (endogeneity). An interesting further research could be conducted
by introduce an instrumental variable into the first hurdle equation.


Consideration of Large Landowners and Different Enterprise
This research stratified landowners into three groups based on the number of wetland

parcels they owned using the 1,159 wetland parcels as the sample frame and the survey
questionnaires were mailed to landowners who own one or two wetland parcels.47 An
alternative, more comprehensive estimation of landowner participation in income-generating

47

See Chapter 5 for more detail for sample stratification.
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activities and level of income would include all landowners. This study combined both alligator
and hunting enterprises data set and examined those factors that motivate private landowners to
participate in these activities and the factors that affect the level of income derived from these
activities. Separate double-hurdle models that examine alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting
separately may also prove useful in some future study.
7.3 Policy Recommendations
The results from this research showed that only a few landowners participated in state or
federal wetland restoration programs. The main reasons that landowners did not enroll any
government restoration programs are: (1) too complicated to apply; (2) don’t want long-term
contract; (3) not enough financial incentive; (4) need the land for other purposes; and (5) other
reasons. Not knowing about available programs was one reason given by landowners for not
enrolling. With respect to current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland restoration
in coastal Louisiana, most landowners indicated a preference for the implementation of
innovative tax incentive programs and subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management. Public
purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements were found to be less popular,
followed by public land purchases.
Understanding the various attitudes among landowners toward wetland restoration
programs provides the opportunity for policy makers to better evaluate current and potential
policies. Although limited findings from this research, the descriptive and empirical results
presented in Chapter 5 and 6 have potential implications with respect to crafting wetland
restoration policy and data collection in coastal Louisiana.
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First, policy makers may consider establishing an education program geared toward the
‘smaller’ (i.e., non-corporation) coastal wetland owners. Unlike corporations with large coastal
property ownership, the opportunity costs of remaining abreast regarding restoration programs is
likely large relative to expected benefits among many of the ‘small’ owners of coastal wetland
parcels. Thus, any education program would need to be developed with this understanding in
mind and tailored accordingly.
Second, as recommended by Coreil (1995), policy makers might consider ‘speeding up’
and simplifying the application process and modifying restoration program contract terms. Many
of the complaints were voiced about the application process and contract terms. Policy
adjustments these issues might prove useful.
Third, policy makers need to ascertain the types of incentives (financial and others) to
entice private landowners to accept a wetland restoration project on their properties. Gaining the
cooperation by the coastal landowners, however, is complicated by the fact that while the public
benefits accruing from wetland protection and restoration projects are likely to be large, private
benefits are likely to be small and, potentially, negative. If coastal restoration and management
needs are to be met in Louisiana, public funds must be leveraged to private investment.
Therefore, financial incentives are likely to play an important role in the decision-making
process among coastal landowners whether or not to engage in coastal restoration activities.
While these financial incentives are important, the potential value of non-monetary incentives
should not be minimized.
Finally, the analysis conducted in Chapter 6 indicates that there are myriad of factors that
determine whether a landowner is expected to participate in income-generating activities and, if
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so, the desired level of income. One might try to tailor programs to these findings. For example,
results indicated that landowners who participated in a state or federal restoration program would
receive less income derived from income-generating activities than landowners who did not
participated in these restoration programs. To the extent that these results are valid, one obvious
program would be to compensate for any loss in income associated with enrollment in a
restoration program. The results, however, also indicate that compensation requirements would
vary along several socioeconomic factors as well as factors specific to the parcel in question.
Compensation could be enhanced/reduced based on these factors. As pointed out in Chapter 2,
not all policy instruments are equally effective in achieving desired social goals given the
alternative enterprises and the influence of different property characteristics and socioeconomic
characteristics on the income-generating potential of coastal property. Since private landowners
with different situations are likely to exhibit heterogeneous preferences over a range of relevant
land use alternatives, therefore, as suggested by Caffey et al. (2003), policy maker need to
consider a portfolio of policy instruments to increase the range of options available for private
landowners.
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APPENDIX B. WETLAND ECONOMIC SURVEY

2015 Wetland Economic Survey

INTRODUCTION
Dear Landowner,
I am writing on behalf of LSU AgCenter and the Louisiana Sea Grant to request your help with an important project. As part of a larger program,
we are conducting a survey to understand why people participate in commercial activities (alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting) on their land
and how we can improve future coastal restoration/maintenance programs in Coastal Louisiana.
The following questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. The information you provide us will be extremely valuable
regarding potential policy instruments aimed at encouraging private participation in coastal wetland maintenance and restoration.
Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time. WE ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Moreover, the results of the survey will be only reported in a summary format, so again no one will link you
to your responses. Please complete the attached questionnaire and return it in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope to us within the next TWO
WEEKS.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any questions or need help with this survey, please feel free to contact us at:
Phone number: 225-578-6296
Email: walterk@lsu.edu or hwang23@lsu.edu
Note: If you prefer to complete this questionnaire online, please provide your email address and parcel ID to Hua Wang at hwang23@lsu.edu and
we will send the appropriate linkage to the questionnaire.
Sincerely,
Walter R. Keithly, Jr.
Survey Project Leader
Louisiana Sea Grant
Louisiana State University

Hua Wang
Survey Project Assistant
Louisiana Sea Grant
Louisiana State University
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Enclosed with this questionnaire is a wetland GIS map which according to parish records is identified as a parcel you own in the
coastal zone. Later in this questionnaire we are going to ask you to focus on commercial activities associated with this parcel
(alligator harvest or waterfowl hunting). And all of your answers will be kept strictly confidential and never associated with your
name.
Section 1: General Information
1)

Do you own the parcel on the map enclosed with this questionnaire?
□ NO
If No, please stop here, fold this booklet, place it
□ YES
in the prepaid envelope and drop it in the mail to
prevent you receiving future mailings from us. We
apologize for the inconvenience and will remove
you from the mailing list.
If Yes, please continue to fill out this survey

2)

How do you own the specific parcel?
□ Sole ownership
□ Joint ownership through an undivided heirship
□ Joint ownership through a corporation or trust
□ Other (please explain)______________________________________

3)

If you maintain joint ownership of the parcel, what is your ownership percentage?
________ %

4)

Based on the enclosed GIS map, is the stated acreage correct?
□ NO
□ YES
If no, what is your estimated of the correct acreage?
________ acres
Approximately how long has this parcel been in family possession?

5)

________ years
6)

7)

Referring to the enclosed GIS map, what types of wetland do you own on this parcel? (Check the answer to all that
apply)
□ Salt marsh
□ Brackish marsh
□ Freshwater marsh
□ There is no wetland on this parcel
Do you use this property for any commercial-based activities?
□ NO – If NO, please skip to question 14
□ YES – If YES, please proceed to question 8

8)

Please indicate the commercial activity (activities) on this property? (Check the answer to all that apply)
□ Alligator harvest (including egg collection)
□ Waterfowl hunting
□ Other (please specify)______________________________________

9)

What is the total number of acres of parcel you use for the following commercial activities? Please outline the area on
the GIS map enclosed and select the type of wetland (check all boxes that apply)
□ Alligator harvest: ________ acres
(□ Salt marsh; □ Brackish marsh; □ Freshwater marsh □ Other)
□ Waterfowl hunting: ________ acres
(□ Salt marsh; □ Brackish marsh; □ Freshwater marsh □ Other)
□ Other: ________ acres
(□ Salt marsh; □ Brackish marsh; □ Freshwater marsh □ Other)

10) Is there any hunting lodge/camp on the parcel?
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□ NO
□ YES
11) Do you actively manage your property for waterfowl habitat (e.g. water control, vegetation management through
burning, cutting, herbicides …)?
□ NO
□ YES
12) What was the revenue derived from the parcel in question from the following commercial activities in 2015? (Again,
this information will be confidential)
□ $ ________ Alligator harvest (including egg collection)
□ $ ________ Waterfowl hunting
□ $ ________ Other
13) Do you receive any sub-surface (oil & gas) revenue from this parcel?
□ NO
□ YES
14) Do you participate in any state or federal wetland restoration programs?
□ NO
□ YES
14a). If YES, which program(s) do you participate in?
□ Former Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) (Merged into Agricultural Conservation Easement
Program in 2014 Farm Bill).
□ Water Bank Program (WBP)
□ Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)
□ Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation & Restoration Act (CWPPRA)
□ Other (please specify)________________________________
14b). If NO, why do you not participate? How important were the following reasons for doing so? Check the
appropriate box for each statement.
Reasons for not participation
(check all that apply)

Not
Important

Somewhat
Important

Very
Important

Too complicated to apply

□

□

□

Don’t want long-term contract

□

□

□

Not enough financial incentive

□

□

□

Need the land for other purposes

□

□

□

Other (explain):______________
___________________________

□

□

□

CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE
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15) How would you rate the following current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland restoration in coastal
Louisiana? Please indicate (by checking a box) the level of importance for each current or pending approach below.

Policy instruments

Public land purchases
Public purchase of permanent or
temporary conservation easements
Establishing new markets for land
Implementing innovative tax
incentive programs
Subsidies for plant, fish, and
wildlife management
Conservation cost sharing
arrangements

Not

Somewhat

Very

Important

Important

Important

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Section 2: Demographics
16) Which range includes your age?
□ Under 25
□ 25 – 34
□ 35 – 44
□ 45 – 54
□ 55 – 64
□ 65 or older
17) What is your gender?
□ Male
□ Female
18) What is your race?
□ White
□ Asian
□ Native American
□ Black/African American
□ Latino/Hispanic
□ Other (please specify) _________
19) Which of the following best describes your total household pre-tax 2015 income?
□ Under $20,000
□ $20,000 - $39,999
□ $40,000 - $59,999
□ $60,000 - $79,999
□ $80,000 - $99,999
□ $100,000 - $150,000
□ Over $150,000
20) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
□ Less than High School
□ High School Degree or equivalent
□ Some College
□ College Degree
□ Bachelor Degree
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□ Master Degree
□ Doctorate
21) Do you consider yourself an active outdoor enthusiast?
□ NO
□ YES
If YES, what are your favorite outdoor activities?
___________________________

22) Do you consider yourself an environmentalist?
□ NO
□ YES
If YES, how would you rate your effort in environmental protection? Please circle the appropriate number (1 with no
effort … 5 with great effort).
1----------2----------3----------4----------5
23) Finally, we welcome your opinion on any topics that might not have been adequately covered in this survey, please use
the space below. Also, if you would like a copy of the final report, please provide an email address and we will send
you an electronic version of the report.

I want to thank you for your time and candid answers. You have been very helpful. Please return the survey within the
next TWO WEEKS in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope provided.
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APPENDIX C. LEVEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Figure C.1 shows the level of income distribution that the landowners in the sample do
not receive any income from income-generating activities and that the level of income varies
among landowners that decide to participate.

Figure C.1 Level of Income Distribution form Income-generating Activities
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APPENDIX D. RESULTS OF THE STANDARD TOBIT MODEL
Table D.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Standard Tobit Model
Coefficient

Standard error

Socioeconomic/Demographic
Characteristics
Age
Education

8778.35**
7512.26*

4324.84
4233.29

Household income
Household_income_one

-2483.36

4427.66

Household_income_two
Household_income_three
Land ownership

-4289.36
Reference group
-10404.49***

3394.52
_
3688.94

Years of ownership

-19.91

46.24

Participating in government program
An active outdoor enthusiast
Property Characteristics

8040.89*
-4222.99

4515.86
3547.97

Southeast parish
Hunting lodge/camp

2320.51
1729.73

3416.91
5017.29

Active management
Land type
Land_type_one

19873.58***

5398.32

5589.34

6252.44

Land_type_two
Land_type_three
Total acreage of freshwater marsh

6449.89
Reference group
5.92***

6675.75
Reference group
1.59

Total acreage of brackish marsh
Total acreage of salt marsh

5.66***
-5.12

1.83
9.12

Total acreage of other type of land
Constant
Sigma
Likelihood ratio statistics
Prob > chi-square

4.19**
-19550.11**
10138.00
92.76
0.00

1.90
8516.53
1294.59

Log-Likelihood
-370.54
Number of observation
122
Note: Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10
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APPENDIX E. RESULTS OF THE GENERALIZED TOBIT MODEL
Table E.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Generalized Tobit Model
First hurdle equation
Second hurdle equation
Socioeconomic/Demographic
Characteristics
Age
0.56
2364.37
(0.47)
(4705.60)
Education
0.74
1986.23
(0.45)
(7495.88)
Household income
Household_income_one
0.05
_
(0.44)
Household_income_two
-0.45
_
(0.38)
Household_income_three
Reference group
_
Land ownership
-0.46
-12163.57
(0.62)
(4016.12)
Percentage of ownership
-0.12
_
(0.72)
Years of ownership
-0.0047
-8.65
(0.0045)
(69.34)
Participating in government program
_
2085.43
(4627.12)
An active outdoor enthusiast
-0.29
_
(0.40)
Property Characteristics
Southeast parish
-0.21
3427.79
(0.34)
(4382.16)
Hunting lodge/camp
0.35
7447.38
(0.56)
(5811.43)
Active management
_
9498.44
(6447.50)
Land type
Land_type_one
0.19
10477.85
(0.66)
(7526.86)
Land_type_two
0.46
6650.91
(0.73)
(7799.27)
Land_type_three
Reference group
Reference group
Total acreage of freshwater marsh
0.0022***
-0.65
(0.0008)
(2.67)
Total acreage of brackish marsh
0.0008**
-1.93
(0.0004)
(2.94)
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Table E.1 continued
Total acreage of salt marsh
Total acreage of other type of land
Constant

-0.0012
(0.0015)
0.0006
(0.0005)
-1.23
(0.99)
10064.93
-0.96
122

11.98
(14.85)
-0.09
(2.95)
4365.61
(11253.96)

Sigma
Rho
Number of observation
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses
Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10

147

APPENDIX F. RESULTS OF THE EXPONENTIAL DOUBLE-HURDLE
MODEL
In the case of the conditional mean of the latent variable has an exponential form instead
of a linear form, the exponential hurdle model can be used to determine the likelihood of
participation and the level of participation. The exponential hurdle model was estimated using
the command ‘churdle exponential depvar [indepvars1] [if] [in] [weight], select (varlists
[,noconstant het(varlisto)]) ll[(#|varname) [option]’ in Stata 14. The maximum-likelihood
estimates of the exponential double-hurdle model are reported in Table F.1 with associated
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. In order to assess whether a linear double-hurdle
or an exponential version is the best econometric specification, the Voung test can be applied to
determine the exponential double-hurdle model versus the linear double-hurdle model. The test t
value is 5.13 with a probability of zero. This result indicates that the linear double-hurdle model
specification is favored over the exponential double-hurdle version.
Table F.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Exponential Double-Hurdle Model
First hurdle equation
Second hurdle equation
Socioeconomic/Demographic
Characteristics
Age
2.037***
-0.662
(0.656)
(0.491)
Education
-0.0175
1.442***
(0.421)
(0.309)
Household income
Household_income_one
-0.149
(0.575)
Household_income_two
-0.0784
(0.468)
Household_income_three
Reference group
Land ownership
-0.768
-1.352***
(0.603)
(0.408)
Years of ownership
0.00727
-0.0166***
(0.00650)
(0.00478)
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Table F.1 continued
Participating in government program
An active outdoor enthusiast
Property Characteristics
Southeast parish
Hunting lodge/camp
Active management

-0.663
(0.435)
0.325
(0.495)
-1.956*
(1.030)
10.47***
(1.470)

Land type
Land_type_one

-0.503
(0.441)
-

-0.494
(0.332)
1.166*
(0.644)
-0.346
(0.724)

2.643**
-0.240
(1.109)
(0.776)
Land_type_two
1.194
-0.368
(1.009)
(0.725)
Land_type_three
Reference group
Reference group
Total acreage of freshwater marsh
0.00418***
0.000397***
(0.00113)
(0.000138)
Total acreage of brackish marsh
0.00116***
0.000285**
(0.000339)
(0.000129)
Total acreage of salt marsh
-0.00106
0.000488
(0.000918)
(0.000982)
Total acreage of other type of land
0.000167
0.000736***
(0.000234)
(0.000137)
Constant
-4.663***
8.847***
(1.163)
(0.828)
Lnsigma
-0.198
(0.134)
Wald x2 statistic
361.78
Log-Likelihood
-318.76
Number of observation
122
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10
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APPENDIX G. EMPIRICAL SIMULATION
Table G.1 Empirical Simulation for Double-Hurdle Model
True
Variable
Statistics
Value
n=250
Age
2
mean
1.990
std.dev
0.301
std. err
0.294
rej. rate
0.060
Education
3
mean
2.990
std.dev
0.227
std. err
0.224
rej. rate
0.040
Household_income_one
3
mean
3.011
std.dev
0.259
std. err
0.260
rej. rate
0.040
Household_income_two
1
mean
1.009
std.dev
0.212
std. err
0.214
rej. rate
0.046
Land ownership
1
mean
1.011
std.dev
0.359
std. err
0.333
rej. rate
0.088
Percentage of ownership
2
mean
1.996
std.dev
0.383
std. err
0.379
rej. rate
0.040
Years of ownership
3
mean
2.999
std.dev
0.003
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First equation
n=500
n=1000
2.009
1.999
0.295
0.281
0.290
0.285
0.056
0.050
2.993
3.005
0.226
0.215
0.223
0.218
0.052
0.049
2.994
2.998
0.256
0.250
0.259
0.248
0.043
0.055
1.004
1.002
0.202
0.200
0.203
0.180
0.048
0.052
0.995
1.003
0.337
0.332
0.330
0.216
0.036
0.052
2.002
1.999
0.378
0.367
0.373
0.370
0.042
0.061
3.001
3.000
0.002
0.001

n=250
1.967
0.292
0.289
0.064
3.011
0.211
0.214
0.032
0.982
0.221
0.218
0.056
2.999
0.003

Second equation
n=500
n=1000
1.996
1.999
0.290
0.289
0.288
0.287
0.042
0.056
2.993
3.005
0.205
0.199
0.213
0.212
0.042
0.053
0.994
1.003
0.219
0.215
0.215
0.209
0.048
0.050
2.999
3.000
0.002
0.001

Table G.1 continued

Participating in other
commercial-based
activities

-1

Participating in
government program

1

An active outdoor
enthusiast

4

Southeast parish

2

Hunting lodge/camp

2

Active management

1

Land_type_one

3

Land_type_two

4

std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev

0.002
0.066
-0.983
0.286
0.283
0.060
4.015
0.220
0.217
0.044
2.006
0.221
0.216
0.064
2.031
0.404
0.385
0.076
1.021
0.393
0.383
0.060
3.023
0.409
0.397
0.064
3.953
0.451
151

0.002
0.056
-0.994
0.284
0.282
0.054
3.992
0.215
0.216
0.060
1.997
0.219
0.214
0.052
1.968
0.394
0.384
0.066
0.987
0.381
0.374
0.053
2.982
0.406
0.396
0.056
4.022
0.447

0.001
0.053
-1.001
0.282
0.279
0.053
4.001
0.208
0.205
0.045
2.002
0.210
0.208
0.050
2.006
0.373
0.370
0.040
1.009
0.364
0.372
0.052
2.987
0.393
0.388
0.052
3.984
0.432

0.002
0.032
0.973
0.382
0.353
0.062
1.989
0.229
0.214
0.048
1.984
0.378
0.364
0.048
1.013
0.389
0.374
0.066
3.013
0.413
0.392
0.045
3.992
0.444

0.001
0.038
0.993
0.350
0.345
0.048
1.997
0.220
0.213
0.062
1.996
0.350
0.362
0.048
1.007
0.378
0.372
0.044
3.001
0.393
0.389
0.054
4.006
0.432

0.001
0.060
0.999
0.344
0.339
0.049
1.995
0.211
0.212
0.053
1.999
0.340
0.355
0.050
0.999
0.373
0.371
0.052
3.000
0.386
0.387
0.052
4.004
0.421

Table G.1 continued

Total acreage of
freshwater marsh

3

Total acreage of brackish
marsh

1

Total acreage of salt
marsh

2

Total acreage of other
type of land

2

std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate
mean
std.dev
std. err
rej. rate

0.448
0.062
2.999
0.00015
0.00014
0.072
1.009
0.00015
0.00014
0.032
1.999
0.00054
0.00055
0.020
1.999
0.00016
0.00015
0.060
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0.439
0.060
2.999
0.00014
0.00013
0.060
0.999
0.00014
0.00013
0.064
1.999
0.00053
0.00052
0.062
1.999
0.00015
0.00012
0.058

0.437
0.050
3.000
0.00013
0.00010
0.055
0.999
0.00013
0.00011
0.058
2.000
0.00052
0.00049
0.042
2.000
0.00014
0.00010
0.048

0.428
0.044
2.999
0.00015
0.00014
0.048
1.000
0.00015
0.00014
0.062
1.999
0.00056
0.00054
0.032
2.001
0.00016
0.00015
0.068

0.427
0.055
3.000
0.00014
0.00013
0.048
1.000
0.00013
0.00012
0.046
2.000
0.00055
0.00053
0.060
2.000
0.00015
0.00013
0.040

0.425
0.054
3.000
0.00012
0.00011
0.051
1.000
0.00011
0.00010
0.049
2.000
0.00052
0.00051
0.055
2.000
0.00013
0.00012
0.048
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